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INTRODUCTION
Promulgation of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994'
concludes the initial phase of a revision process that started in
the mid-1980s amid great expectations in some quarters. The
goal of some of the revision participants was to transform the
organizing theory of partnership law from fiduciary obligation to
contract-nothing less than an attempted revolution in partner-
* Associate Professor, Washington & Lee University School of Law. B.A., Yale
University 1976; J.D., Yale University 1979. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of
the Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington & Lee University. I would like to thank
Randy Bezanson, David Millon, Doug Rendleman, Barry Sullivan, and Brenda Lynch
Vestal for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I also would like to thank my
research assistant, Barbara Jane League, for her valuable contributions.
1. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the Con-
ference) designates the revised statute: "Uniform Partnership Act (1994)." U.P.A. §
1002 (1994). However, to avoid confusion with the original Uniform Partnership Act,
text references are to the "Revised Uniform Partnership Act," or the "Revised Act."
Footnote citations to the Revised Act are styled "U.P.A. (1994)." Text references to
the original Uniform Partnership Act are to the "Uniform Partnership Act." Footnote
citations to the original Uniform Partnership Act are styled "U.P.A. (1969)."
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ship law.
At issue have been two competing views of the core rights and
obligations of partners within the partnership relation. The first
vision is best described as fiduciary in nature,2 the second as
contractarian' Proponents of both visions use the rhetoric of fi-
duciary duty, but with quite different meanings.4
In the fiduciary world view, the core rights and obligations of
partners are in critical aspects status based, unamendable, and
expansively construed.' The rights and obligations are status
based because they inhere in the concept of partnership and are
unamendable because they are definitional.' The rights and obli-
gations of partners are construed expansively because they are
the enabling mechanism for broad judicial supervision of part-
nership affairs.'
Not so in the contractarian vision. In the contractarian
worldview, the core rights and obligations of partners are con-
tract based, fully amendable, and narrowly construed.' In this
view, fiduciary obligations are mere gap fillers, dependent on the
express and implied terms of the specific contract at issue.9 As
2. See Claire M. Dickerson, Is It Appropriate To Appropriate Corporate Concepts:
Fiduciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 111
(1993); Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1993), reprinted in 36 CORP. PRAC.
COMMENTATOR 923 (1995); Letter from Melvin A. Eisenberg to the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (July 17, 1992) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Eisenberg,
July 17, 1992 Letter]; Letter from Melvin A. Eisenberg to the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (July 27, 1992) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Eisenberg,
July 27, 1992, Letter].
3. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for
Prime Time, 49 BUS. LAW. 45 (1993) [hereinafter Ribstein, Prime Time]; Larry E.
Ribstein, A Mid-Term Assessment of the Project To Revise the Uniform Partnership
Act, 46 BUS. LAW. 111 (1990) [hereinafter Ribstein, Mid-Term); Larry E. Ribstein, An
Analysis of Georgia's New Partnership Law, 36 MERCER L. REV. 443 (1985); Vestal,
supra note 2, at part II.
4. This difference in usage is not confined to the partnership debate. See infra
note 311 and accompanying text.
5. See Vestal, supra note 2, at 524-30.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Professor Terry O'Neill traces the parallel evolution of corporation law. Terry
A. O'Neill, Self-Interest and Concern for Others in the Owner-Managed Firm: A Sug-
gested Approach to Dissolution and Fiduciary Obligation in Close Corporations, 22
-SETON HALL L. REV. 646, 654-57 (1992).
9. Ribstein, Prime Time, supra note 3, at 52.
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gap fillers, they are merely defaults and are fully amendable by
the parties." If the partners do not alter the statutory defaults,
then the court must determine how the parties would have con-
tracted on the term at issue. Thus, the court is not reviewing
partner conduct against a generalized standard of conduct; it is
attempting to determine how the parties would have resolved the
situation had they addressed it ex ante.1
The contractarians had substantial influence in the revision
process. 12 Successive drafts showed an infusion of contractarian
concepts and language. 3 As general propositions, the Revised
Fiduciary duty is a type of contractual term courts supply because the
parties themselves would have contracted for the duties if it were not so
costly to contract in detail. Fiduciary duties do not differ fundamentally
from other types of terms the courts supply in interpreting contracts.
Because fiduciary duties are contractual "gap-fillers," the precise nature of
the duties that exist in any particular contractual relationship depends on
the express and implied terms of the relevant contract.
Id.
10. Dickerson, supra note 2, at 111-13; O'Neill, supra note 8, at 656-57. Professor
O'Neill correctly observes that, "[d]espite its seeming neutrality as to content...
recharacterizing fiduciary rules as default rules fundamentally alters the source
of. . . obligations, and thus requires a radically different analysis of them." Id. at
657.
11. Ribstein, Prime Time, supra note 3, at 52.
12. Dean Donald J. Weidner, the Reporter for the Revised Act, cast the distinction
between "libertarian, free-market oriented" policy makers who "suggest that all the
rules governing the relations among partners should be merely default rules," and
"parentalistic" policy makers who "would be more inclined to support mandatory
fiduciary duties to protect minority partners." Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Deci-
sions Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership Act, 46 BUS. LAW. 427, 454 (1991).
Dean Weidner acknowledged "the basic libertarian policy perspective of the Drafting
Committee" which
wanted to make clear that all but a very few of the rules governing the
relations among partners are merely default rules. It was only in rare
situations that the Committee felt that the rules should be mandatory.
Mandatory rules governing the relations among partners are essentially
parentalistic, and the Committee felt that, with only very limited excep-
tion, adults in nonconsumer transactions should be held to their agree-
ments.
Id.
13. The Uniform Partnership Act revision effort has produced multiple drafts. First
came the listing of objectives, not really a draft as such, of an ABA committee.
U.P.A. Revision Subcomm. of the Comm. on Partnerships and Unincorporated Bus.
Orgs., Sec. of Corp. Banking & Bus. Law, A.B.A., Should the Uniform Partnership
Act be Revised?, 43 BUS. LAW. 121 (1987) [hereinafter ABA Report].
The Drafting Committee to Revise the Uniform Partnership Act of the National
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Act recognizes the primacy of the partnership agreement over the
statute 4 and the full amenability of the statutory provisions. 5
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws generated at least fourteen
working drafts leading to the first promulgation of the Revised Act in 1992. U.P.A.
(Jan. 9, 1989, Draft); U.P.A. (Feb. 17, 1989, Draft); U.P.A. (July 28 - Aug. 4, 1989,
Meeting Draft); U.P.A. (Dec. 3, 1989, Draft); U.P.A. (Feb. 14, 1990, Draft); U.P.A.
(Apr. 16, 1990, Draft); U.P.A. (July 13-20, 1990, Meeting Draft); U.P.A. (Dec. 6, 1990,
Draft); U.P.A. (Jan. 19, 1991, Draft); U.P.A. (Mar. 11, 1991, Draft); U.P.A. (Aug. 2-9,
1991, Meeting Draft); J.P.A. (Dec., 13, 1991, Draft); U.P.A. (June 1, 1992, Draft);
U.P.A. (July 30 - Aug. 6, 1992, Meeting Draft).
The 1992 annual meeting of the Conference considered the July, 1992 draft and
several amendments. REVISIONS TO U.P.A. (July 30, 1992) [hereinafter R.U.P.A. AN-
NUAL MEETING JULY 30, 1992, REVISIONS]; AMENDMENTS TO U.P.A. (Aug. 2, 1992)
[hereinafter R.U.P.A. ANNUAL MEETING AUGUST 2, 1992, REVISIONS]; AMENDMENTS TO
U.P.A. (Aug. 3, 1992) [hereinafter R.U.P.A. ANNUAL MEETING AUG. 3, 1992, REVI-
SIONS].
The 1992 annual meeting of the Conference passed the Revised Act by a unani-
mous vote of the state delegations. U.P.A. (1992) (Aug. 1992, Adoption) [hereinafter
R.U.P.A. 1992 ADOPTED TEXT]. Pursuant to Conference policy, the adopted text was
then reviewed and modified in non-substantive detail to produce a final text. R.U.P.A.
(1992).
Further revisions were proposed on the basis of continuing consultations between
the Conference's Drafting Committee to Revise the Uniform Partnership Act and
various ABA committees. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON RUPA, OF THE COMM. ON
PARTNERSHIPS AND UNINCORPORATED BUS. ORGS., 1992 ABA SEC. BUS. L., REPORT
(on file with the author) [hereinafter ABA 1992 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT]; R.U.P.A.
(Apr. 14, 1993, Draft). The Conference reconsidered parts of the Revised Act at its
1993 annual meeting and passed a series of amendments. AMENDMENTS TO U.P.A.
(July 30 - Aug. 6, 1993) [hereinafter R.U.P.A. 1993 ANNUAL MEETING REVISIONS].
This meeting generated another draft. R.U.P.A. (1992) (July 2, 1993, Draft). The
Conference then issued an amended text. R.U.P.A. (Aug. 17, 1993, Adoption) [herein-
after R.U.P.A. 1993 ADOPTED TEXT]. Once again the text was subjected to a non-sub-
stantive style review, and a final version was issued. U.P.A_ (1993).
Further revisions were again proposed through continuing consultations between
the Conference's Drafting Committee to Revise the Uniform Partnership Act and
various ABA committees. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON RUPA, ABA SEC. BUS. L., SUPPLE-
MENTAL REPORT (Oct. 1993) (on file with the author) (recommending against enact-
ment of the Revised Act in its then-existing form) [hereinafter ABA 1993 SUBCOMMIT-
TEE REPORT]. Further drafts were generated. U.P.A. (Dec. 7, 1993, Draft); U.P.A.
(Jan. 18, 1994, Draft); U.P.A. (Feb. 5, 1994, Draft); U.P.A. (June 1, 1994, Draft). The
June, 1994, draft was approved by the Conference at its annual meeting in August,
1994. U.P.A. (1994). Also in August, 1994, the House of Delegates of the ABA ap-
proved the Revised Act.
14. U.P.A. § 103(a) (1994) ("Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), rela-
tions among the partners and between the partners and the partnership are governed
by the partnership agreement. To the extent the partnership agreement does not
otherwise provide, this [Act] governs relations among the partners and between the
partners and the partnership.").
15. Id. § 103(a)-(b) (providing that statutory provisions are fully amendable except
1562
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Contractarian influence also is found within the fiduciary duty
provisions. The Revised Act's fiduciary duties are stated narrowly
and exclusively. 6 And, although to some analysts a cursory re-
view of the fiduciary duty provisions of the Revised Act "reflects
a thoroughly anti-contractarian tone,"'" the provisions yield an
essentially contractarian result. 8 The obligation of good faith
and fair dealing 9 conforms to contractarian theory by being cast
as a non-fiduciary obligation"° and by being broadly modifiable
by agreement of the parties.2' The Revised Act's approval of the
as restricted for provisions set forth in § 103(b)).
16. Id. § 404(a) ("The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and
the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in subsec-
tions (b) and (c).").
17. Dickerson, supra note 2, at 145.
18. Id. at 145-47. Professor Dickerson's argument is that the "escape routes" from
the duty of loyalty, the § 404(e) approval of self-interest and the § 103(b)(3) authori-
zation of categorical exceptions, permit "the parties to enter into a valid, enforceable
agreement that would remove, prospectively, virtually any duty of loyalty." Id. at 145-
46. Such a result, she suggests, offers little more protection than a provision allowing
elimination of a statutory default duty of loyalty. Id. at 147.
19. U.P.A. § 404(d) (1994) (establishment of non-fiduciary obligation of "good faith
and fair dealing").
20. Dickerson, supra note 2, at 133.
21. The non-fiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing may not be elim-
inated by the agreement of the partners, "but the partnership agreement may pre-
scribe the standards by which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if
the standards are not manifestly unreasonable." U.P.A. § 103(b)(5) (1994).
Professor Dickerson correctly looks to the substance of the treatment and not to
the formal protection against elimination. Dickerson, supra note 2, at 143-44. "It
appears that, absent a showing that the agreement is 'manifestly unreasonable,' the
parties could stipulate that any party, vis-a-vis the other partners and the partner-
ship, can act according to a standard as low as mere 'honesty in fact.' Such a result
is contractarian." Id. at 144 (citations omitted). Professor Dickerson does note the §
103(b)(5) restrictions on amendments of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing,
correctly observing that "while this is anti-contractarian in form, it is not so in sub-
stance." Id. at 144-45; see Vestal, supra note 2, at 556-59. There is no consensus on
how narrowly the courts will limit the ability of the parties to restrict the definition
of good faith and fair dealing. I tend to believe the courts will allow wide latitude
for agreements limiting the fiduciary duties and the non-fiduciary obligation of good
faith and fair dealing. Id. at 559-60. The drafters effectively conceded the point in
the floor debates. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMM. OF THE
WHOLE, 492-501 (July 31 - Aug. 6, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 NATIONAL CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS]; see Robert M. Phillips, Comment, Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1179, 1181-82 (1993).
("IT]he obligation of good faith and fair dealing is expressly made non-waivable--the
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pursuit of self-interest in the partnership setting is antithetical to
a fiduciary analysis22 but is compatible with a contractarian-
based approach.23 Professor Dickerson's overall assessment is
reasonable:
It is ... difficult to escape the conclusion that [the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act's] provisions concerning fiduciary
duties and the related obligation of good faith, while not exclu-
sively contractarian, represent a strong shift in that direction
as compared to the fiduciary duties currently applicable to
partnerships under [the Uniform Partnership Act].24
Despite the thematic acceptance of the contractarian view, the
details of implementation abandon the contractarian approach in
important ways. In the end, the contractarian failure is perhaps
most keenly felt in the Revised Act's provisions dealing with the
disclosure obligations of partners inter se. Here, in the details of
the partners' statutory obligations to disclose information to oth-
er partners or to the partnership, the contl'actarian revolution
stumbles to a halt. The Revised Act includes an expanded and
broadly defined right of access to partnership books and re-
obligation is mandatory.").
It is unclear what the term "standards" means in this context [which is
the authority now found in U.P.A. § 103(b)(5) (1994), to "determine the
standards by which the performance of the obligation is to be measured,
if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable"]. Does this language
permit private definitions of good faith that will be absolutely respected
by courts? Probably not. The inclusion of a "manifestly unreasonable"
limitation effectively narrows the latitude to negotiate particular standards
of good faith by subjecting all such privately negotiated definitions to
external, objective review.
Id. at 1182 n.16.
22. Vestal, supra note 2, at 553-55.
23. Dickerson, supra note 2, at 144. Professor Dickerson describes the provision,
which is § 404(e) in the Revised Act, as "neither truly contractarian nor truly anti-
contractarian" but believes "it leans towards the former." Id.
24. Id. at 149. The reporter for the Revised Act has described the development of
the fiduciary duty sections as "a battleground between the libertarians and the
parentalists," the outcome of which was that "the libertarians achieved a victory to
the extent that [the Revised Act] . .. gives statutory legitimacy to the pursuit of
individual self-interest." Donald J. Weidner, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act
Midstream: Major Policy Decisions, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 825, 857-58 (1990); see also
Vestal, supra note 2, at 535-36.
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cords.25 This right is protected against unreasonable restric-
tion,28 a protection deemed "senseless" by one contractarian
critic.27 It provides for a broad, non-demand-driven disclosure
obligation.5 The proposed regime contains frontal restrictions
on partner agreements that would modify key statutory provi-
sions" and further contains implied restrictions on partner
agreements that would weaken the statutory remedies for viola-
tions of core statutory duties. 0 By deferring to non-partnership-
specific law on some partnership-related claims, the Revised Act
opens the door for the resurrection of fiduciary-based analysis
with respect to certain claims historically within the range of
partnership law.3 ' The Revised Act leaves open an argument
that the statutory provisions do not displace certain common-law
disclosure obligations of partners"2 -obligations historically not
subject to broad modifications by the parties."3 Finally, ambigu-
ities in the statutory language allow arguments that certain com-
mon-law disclosure obligations not frontally included in the revi-
sion are included by implication. 4 Each of these points repre-
sents a setback for the contractarian position.
Thus, with passage of the Uniform Partnership Act of 1994,
the revision effort has come to an uncertain conclusion. The
Revised Act does not return to a truly fiduciary view of the part-
nership relation; thematically, it remains largely contractarian.
But it does not clearly articulate and completely effectuate the
contractarian vision. The Revised Act is, as to the operational
details, internally contradictory and confused. It has been de-
nounced by some of the most vocal advocates of partnership
contractarianism,"5 and its fiduciary sections are the subject of
25. U.P.A. § 403(b) (1994); see discussion infra part II.A.
26. Id. § 103(b)(2) ("The partnership agreement may not . . . unreasonably restrict
the right of access to books and records . . ").
27. Professor Ribstein argues that the section "senselessly invalidates" otherwise
reasonable agreements. Ribstein, Prime Time, supra note 3, at 51-52.
28. U.P.A. § 403(c)(1); see discussion infra part II.B.
29. U.P.A. § 103(b).
30. Id. §§ 103 cmt. 1, 405 cmt. 3; see discussion infra part II.F.
31. See discussion infra part II.G.3.
32. See discussion infra part III.A.
33. Vestal, supra note 2, at 556-63.
34. See discussion infra part III.B.
35. Ribstein, Prime Time, supra note 3, at 45 (concluding that the 1993 version of
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criticism on both the right and left. 6
The first phase of the contractarian revolution in partnership
law has ended, apparently in failure. Where do we go from here?
To simply abandon the Revised Act would be unwise. Many excel-
lent changes are included in the revision--changes that are not
the product of contractarian fiduciary duty analysis. Too much
valuable work is embodied in the Revised Act for the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to start
from a blank slate with another revision of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act. Moreover, both the Conference and the American Bar
Association have approved the Revised Act, and states have be-
gun to adopt it, although in non-uniform versions. 7
the Revised Act should not be adopted); ABA 1992 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 13, at 1 (recommending that the 1992 version of the Revised Act should not be
adopted); ABA 1993 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 1 (recommending that
the 1993 version of the Revised Act should not be adopted). Some of the ABA
subcommittee's criticisms had an underlying contractarian component; in a number of
cases these criticisms have not been met in the final version of the Revised Act. For
example, in the 1992 reaction, the ABA subcommittee listed problems with § 404,
including the fiduciary duty formulation and the concept of an obligation of good
faith and fair dealing as a matter "of such importance that, without correction they
would stand as a barrier to achieving the level of support necessary for the Subcom-
mittee to recommend RUPA for adoption in any jurisdiction." ABA 1992 SUBCOMMIT-
TEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 3-4. The Subcommittee also objected to many of the
inclusions in § 103. Id. at 2. The 1993 critique lists the standards of partnership
conduct and the inability to vary such standards by agreement of the partners as a
"principal concern" of the committee. ABA 1993 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note
13, at 1, 4-5, A-3 to A-4. The ABA subcommittee was highly critical of changes made
by the full Conference at its 1992 meeting, noting that "[§ 404] was radically
changed in response to an emotional letter delivered to the floor of the NCCUSL
meeting in August [1992]." ABA 1992 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.
Presumably the reference is to the two letters from Professor Eisenberg, which are,
correctly in my opinion, highly critical of the contractarian influence on the Revised
Act. See Eisenberg, July 17, 1992, Letter, supra note 2; Eisenberg, July 27, 1992,
Letter, supra note 2.
36. See Dickerson, supra note 2, at 140-45; Ribstein, Prime Time, supra note 3, at
52-61; Vestal, supra note 2, at 535-37.
37. At the time this Article was written, three states had passed some form of the
Revised Act. Montana and Wyoming have passed the 1992 version without substantial
amendment. Montana Uniform Partnership Act, MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 35, ch. 10
(1993); Wyoming Uniform Partnership Act, 1993 Wyo. S. No. 126, 52d Sess. Texas
has passed a version with many non-standard features. Texas Revised Partnership
Act, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 917 (Vernon). Other states have various versions of
the Revised Act under consideration. California, Illinois, Minnesota, New Mexico and
Virginia have proposed legislation which would adopt the Revised Act without sub-
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There are three needs, at least in the short term. The first is
to identify the contractarian errors in the proposed regime. The
second is to develop a set of amendments to reverse the worst
manifestations of contractarian error. The third is to suggest
ways in which the contractarian error can be challenged
interpretively in jurisdictions where the Revised Act is adopted
without appropriate amendment.
In the longer term, we should consider another general revi-
sion of partnership law. Such an effort should borrow heavily
from the non-contractarian-based changes suggested in the cur-
rent Revised Act. The dual justifications for such a revision effort
would be to return partnership law to a fiduciary foundation and
to re-introduce uniformity into partnership law.
This Article looks primarily to the short-term agenda, specifi-
cally as it relates to the disclosure obligations of partners."8 Part
stantial amendment See Cal. A.B. 2612, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1993); InI. S. 455, 88th
Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (1993); Iln. S. 772, 88th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (1993); Minn. H.
1795, 78th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (1993)- Minn. S. 1646, 78th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess.
(1993); N.M. H. 65, 41st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (1994); Va. H. 1048, 1994-95 Reg. Sess.
(1994). However, all of these bills have died in committee or have been held over,
perhaps as a result of the ongoing revisions by the Conference. Telephone Interview
with Office of Chief Clerk of Assembly, Cal. Leg. (Aug. 11, 1994); Telephone Inter-
view with Legislative Information System, Ill. Gen. Ass. (Aug. 11, 1994); Telephone
Interview with House Index, Minn. (Aug. 11, 1994); Telephone Interview with Senate
Information Office, Minn. Leg. (Aug. 11, 1994); Telephone Interview with Legislatvie
Council Service, N.M. Leg. (Aug. 12, 1994); Telephone Interview with Legislative
Information Office, Va. Gen. Ass. (Aug. 11, 1994). The Nebraska State Legislature
passed a resolution to study whether it should adopt the Revised Act. Neb. Res. 360,
93d Leg., 2d Sess. (1994).
38. I have outlined such a program with respect to the Revised Act's general fidu-
ciary duty provisions, Vestal, supra note 2, suggested changes of the Revised Act's
choice of law provisions, Allan W. Vestal, Choice of Law and the Fiduciary Duties of
Partners Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 79 IOWA. L. REV. 219 (1994)
[hereinafter Vestal, Choice of Law], argued the Revised Act ought not be applied to
existing partnerships, Allan W. Vestal, Should the Uniform Partnership Act of 1994
Really Be Retroactive?, 50 BUS. LAW. 267 (1994), explored the confusion inherent in
Revised Act § 103 and the prospects for compromise of the fiduciary-contractarian de-
bate, Allan W. Vestal, Advancing the Search for Compromise: A Response to Professor
Hynes, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 1995) [hereinafter Vestal, Compro-
mise], traced the impact of the Revised Act on limited partnership law, Allan W.
Vestal, A Comprehensive Uniform Limited Partnership Act? The Time Has Come, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 1995), and critiqued the development of the disclo-
sure provisions through the Summer, 1990, meeting of the Conference, Allan W.
Vestal, "Ask Me No Questions and I'll Tell You No Lies": Statutory and Common-
1995] 1567
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I briefly describes the existing partnership disclosure regime
provided by the common law and the Uniform Partnership Act.
Part II describes and critiques the disclosure structure contained
in the Revised Act and outlines a series of amendments to correct
errors in the proposed regime. Part III presents several analyses,
which could be used in jurisdictions that do not modify the Re-
vised Act disclosure provisions, to mitigate the damage caused by
the provisions and further erode the contractarian aspect of the
Revised Act disclosure regime.
The failure of the contractarian revolution in partnership
law-if that is indeed what we are seeing-is another indication
of more general dissatisfaction with contractarian theory when
the theory is applied to concrete legal problems. The partnership
disclosure regime offers another example where the simplification
offered by contractarian analysis leads to unacceptable results
when the theory is translated to specific legal rules and decisions.
When confronted with the statutory provisions that necessarily
flow from contractarian theory, the drafters of the Revised Uni-
form Partnership Act balked at the results and compromised the
theory. There is a valuable lesson from that process for the larger
debate.
I. DIscLoSuRE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT AND THE COMMON LAW
Under the existing regime, intra-partnership disclosure re-
quirements arise under both the statutory and the common law.
The common law requires disclosure by partners inter se in two
circumstances: the first involving transactions between a partner
and the partnership, and the second involving the purchase by
one partner of another's interest.
The classification for transactions with the partnership in-
cludes situations where one partner. usurps a partnership oppor-
tunity, 9 where one partner purchases an asset required for part-
nership business activities without disclosure, ° and where one
Law Disclosure Requirements Within High-Tech Joint Ventures, 65 TUL L. REV. 705
(1991) [hereinafter Vestal, Disclosure].
39. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928).
40. Bakalis v. Bressler, 115 N.E.2d 323 (Ill. 1953).
1568 [Vol. 36:1559
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partner mischaracterizes partnership income as non-partnership
income.41 Another example is where a partner sells an asset to
the partnership, or buys an asset from the partnership, without
disclosing information relevant to the valuation of the asset that
is within the partner's knowledge but unknown to the partner-
ship.42 The second category of common-law disclosure involves
the purchase and sale of partnership interests inter se. In such
situations, partners must disclose information that is unavailable
to the other party to the transaction and bears on the value of
the partnership interest being sold.43
41. See Peskin v. Deutsch, 479 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Ill. App. 1985).
42. Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 730. I have argued that one leading for-
mulation of this category is too narrow. Id. at 729-30. In their treatise, Professors
Reuschlein and Gregory narrowly define the transactions with the partnership com-
mon-law disclosure situation to "prepartnership transactions":
One class of cases emphasizing this duty to disclose are those involving
prepartnership transactions, such as those involving a transfer to the part-
nership of property previously owned or recently acquired by one of the
parties to the agreement of partnership. In these cases the interests of a
partner in such property or the cost at which it was obtained by a part-
ner are material facts which it is the partner's duty to disclose.
HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY
AND PARTNERSHIP § 189 (1979) (citations omitted). I believe the Reuschlein and Greg-
ory categorization should be expanded to include all transactions between the
partnership and a partner that take place during the formation, term, or dissolution
and winding up of the partnership. Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 730.
Professor Ribstein evidently agrees with the result, although he gets there in a
rather circuitous manner. 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG
AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP 6:60-62 (1988). He first notes the UPA § 20 demand-
driven disclosure obligation. Id. at 6:60. He then reads the demand component out of
the statutory provision:
[T)he courts have held that, at least in some situations, the duty is
breached by a failure to make affirmative disclosure even in the absence
of an explicit demand. In general, no demand should be required to trig-
ger an affirmative disclosure duty if the circumstances indicate that the
party entitled to disclosure is relying on the other party to provide
it. . . . The duty arises during the partnership's operations . . . . The
duty also applies to transactions connected with formation and liquidation
of the partnership or partnership interest.
Id. at 6:61-62. The result is the same-a non-demand-driven disclosure obligation as
to transactions with the partnership during the formation, operation, and dissolution
and winding up of the partnership.
43. Professors Reuschlein and Gregory summarize the obligation as: "Both selling
and purchasing partner are duty bound to reveal such facts as touch the value of the
property which are not available to the other partner." REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY,
supra note 42, § 189, at 280 (citing Johnson v. Buck, 540 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.
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The Uniform Partnership Act also requires disclosures by part-
ners inter se. Statutory disclosure obligations arise in five situa-
tions, either affirmatively or by implication. There are statutory
rights to information regarding the routine operations of the
partnership,44 to information contained in the partnership's
1976)). Professors Bromberg and Ribstein find a "duty to render complete informa-
tion" which arises "in connection with interpartner transfers of partnership inter-
ests." BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 42, at 6:60-61. They appear to find the
obligation, however, by reading the demand component out of U.P.A. § 20, not by
acknowledging the continuation of the common-law rule parallel with the statutory
provision. Id. The cases they cite do not support this reading. Five of the cases pre-
date the Uniform Partnership Act and necessarily rely on the common law. See
Brooks v. Martin, 69 U.S. 70, 84 (1863); Caldwell v. Davis, 15 P. 696 (Colo. 1887);
Gilbert & O'Callighan v. Anderson, 66 A. 926 (N.J. 1907); Kelly v. Delaney, 121
N.Y.S. 241 (App. Div. 1910); Wright v. Duke, 36 N.Y.S. 853 (App. Div. 1895). Eleven
of the cases decided after promulgation of the U.P.A. make no mention of the U.P.A.
and are couched in terms of fiduciary duty. See Witter v. Torbett, 604 F. Supp. 298,
306 (W.D. Va. 1984) (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. App. Div.
1928)); Reed v. Robilio, 273 F. Supp. 954, 960-61 (W.D. Tenn. 1967) ("fiduciary du-
ty"), affd, 400 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1968); Ohaco Sheep Co. v. Heirs of Ohaco, 713
P.2d 343, 346 (Ariz. App. 1986) ("utmost good faith"); W.A. McMichael Constr. Co. v.
D&W Properties, Inc., 356 So. 2d 1115, 1122 (La. App.) ("fiduciary duty"), writ de-
nied, 359 So. 2d 198 (La. 1978); Hagen v. Dundore, 50 A.2d 570, 575 (Md. 1947)
("confidential and fiduciary relation"); Poss v. Gottlieb, 193 N.Y.S. 418, 420-21 (App.
Term 1922) ("relationship ... of trust and confidence"); Auld v. Estridge, 382
N.Y.S.2d 897, 898 (Spec. Term 1976) (citing Meinhard and applying a "fiduciary
relationship" standard); Guggenheim v. Guggenheim, 159 N.Y.S. 333, 339 (Spec. Term
1916) ("rule of positive law"); Buck, 540 S.W.2d at 399 ("confidential agent"); Inman
v. Parr, 311 S.W.2d 658, 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) ("highest duty of honesty and
fair dealing"); Bovy v. Graham, Cohen & Wampold, 564 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Wash. App.
1977) ("fiduciary relationship"). Only one of the cited cases refers to the Uniform
Partnership Act, noting in passing, in a discussion that includes authorities going
back as far as the Roman Republic, that the U.P.A. "recognizes" the pre-existing
good faith requirement, although not basing the decision on the Uniform Partnership
Act. Alexander v. Sims, 249 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Ark 1952). Bromberg and Ribstein also
cite a law review commentary, Leona Beane, The Fiduciary Relationship of a Partner,
5 J. CORP. LAW. 483 (1980). I have argued that this commentary is not persuasive as
to a merger of the common-law and statutory obligations. Vestal, Disclosure, supra
note 38, at 735-39.
44. The Uniform Partnership Act does not contain an affirmative provision requir-
ing routine disclosures to partners of information necessary for their participation in
the management of the enterprise. However, Professor Melvin Eisenberg argues con-
vincingly that such an obligation is implied in § 18 of the U.P.A. MELVIN EISENBERG,
AN INTRODUCTION TO AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 42 (1987). Section 18 provides that,
absent the contrary agreement of the partners, "[a]ll partners have equal rights in
the management and conduct of the partnership business." U.P.A. § 18(e) (1969).
From this provision, Professor Eisenberg argues that "[the effect of Section 18(e) 'is
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books,45 and to information required for a judicial accounting. 6
There are statutory obligations to disclose partnership-related
information in response to an inquiry from another partner47
and information relating to diversions of partnership profits and
assets.4 "
The common-law and statutory disclosure obligations of part-
ners inter se co-exist under the present regime. The Uniform
Partnership Act did not automatically displace the common law
of partnerships. Indeed, the statute specifically provides that the
law of agency shall continue to apply under the Uniform
Partnership Act,49 and that "[i]n any case not provided for in
this act the rules of law and equity.., shall govern."" Analysis
of cases decided after adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act
confirms that the disclosure provisions of the statute did not
displace the common-law disclosure requirements, and that the
two disclosure regimes continue to exist in parallel."'
to require that, absent contrary agreement, every partner is to be provided on an
ongoing basis with information concerning the partnership business, and be consulted
in partnership decisions."' EISENBBRG, supra, at 42. Professor Eisenberg's analysis
was noted by the Revised Act drafters. See U.P.A. § 20 cmt, (July 28 - Aug. 4, 1989,
Meeting Draft).
45. The Uniform Partnership Act provides that "Ithe partnership books shall be
kept, subject to any agreement between the partners, at the principal place of busi-
ness of the partnership, and every partner shall at all times have access to and may
inspect and copy any of them." U.P.A. § 19 (1969).
46. "Any partner shall have the right to a formal account as to partnership af-
fairs" if the partner is wrongfully excluded from the partnership business, if an
agreement of the partners so provides, if a situation otherwise covered under the
§ 21 accounting obligation requires, or "[w~henever other circumstances render it just
and reasonable." Id. § 22.
47. "Partners shall render on demand true and full information of all things af-
fecting the partnership to any partner or the legal representative of any deceased
partner or partner under legal disability." Id. § 20.
48. "Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as
trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners
from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the
partnership or from any use by him of its property." Id. § 21(1).
49. Id. § 4(3).
50. Id. § 5.
51. Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 735-39. Professor Ribstein puts another
spin on the cases: "The prior case law overlooked the UPA [§ 20] demand re-
quirement and compelled disclosure in other appropriate circumstances." Ribstein,
Prime Time, supra note 3, at 51 (citations omitted).
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II. DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE REVISED ACT:
CRITIQUE AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
The Revised Act continues the basic elements of the disclosure
regime under the Uniform Partnership Act. The familiar tools of
the right to inspect partnership books, the demand-driven duty to
disclose, the duty to account as a fiduciary for diverted benefits,
and the right to a formal accounting are all present, albeit with
some substantial modifications. In addition, the Revised Act codi-
fies a non-demand-driven disclosure requirement. While the basic
regime is familiar, and many of the changes are justified, a num-
ber of significant problems remain that should be the subject of
further amendments of the Revised Act.
A. The Revised Act Section 403(a) and (b) Examination of Books
and Records Disclosure Mechanism Requires Further
Development
The Revised Act contains a guarantee of partner access to
partnership books and records.52 This language is designed to
expand the rights of partners over their rights under the Uni-
form Partnership Act.5" Several problems remain.
The Uniform Partnership Act is ambiguous on whether the
partnership is required to keep any books.54 An early draft of
52. U.P.A. § 403(b) (1994).
(b) A partnership shall provide partners and their agents and attor-
neys access to its books and records. It shall provide former partners and
their agents and attorneys access to books and records pertaining to the
period during which they were partners. The right of access provides the
opportunity to inspect and copy books and records during ordinary busi-
ness hours. A partnership may impose a reasonable charge, covering the
costs of labor and material, for copies of documents furnished.
Id.
53. Compare U.P.A. § 19 (1969) ("The partnership books shall be kept, subject to
any agreement between the partners, at the principal place of business of the part-
nership, and every partner shall at all times have access to and may inspect and
copy any of them.") with U.P.A. § 403(b) (1994).
54. U.P.A. § 19 (1969); see supra note 53 (quoting U.P.A. § 19). Confusion on this
score arises under the Uniform Partnership Act from the question of whether the
clause "subject to any agreement between the partners" modifies the basic obligation
to keep partnership books or merely modifies the location at which the books must
be kept. The latter seems the better reading. Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 35, at
721. The official commentary to the Revised Act is uncertain on this point. After an-
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the Revised Act added a provision that "[e]ach partnership shall
keep complete and correct books and records of account."55 The
drafters apparently split, however, on whether requiring that
books be kept is appropriate,56 and later drafts deleted the provi-
sion.57 The Revised Act eliminates the ambiguity by clearly indi-
cating that there is no requirement under the Revised Act for the
partnership to keep any books or records.58 Having eliminated
the requirement that books be kept, however, the official com-
mentary includes a curious directive as to the minimum books
and records that a partnership should maintain.59
nouncing that Revised Act § 403(a) "continues the UPA Section 19 rule, modified to
include partnership records other than its 'books,"' the official commentary is unclear
as to whether the existing provision requires that books be kept. U.P.A. § 403 cmt. 1
(1994). "Any requirement in UPA Section 19 that the partnership keep books is
oblique at best, since it states merely where the books shall be kept, not that they
shall be kept," Id The "oblique" characterization is from the Crane and Bromberg
treatise, although the treatise authors give a rather more positive read to Uniform
Partnership Act § 19, noting that the section is "rather oblique, since the statement
is primarily where they shall be kept, and only secondarily that they shall be kept."
ALAN R. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 66, at 383 n.13
(1968).
55. U.P.A. § 19 (Jan. 9, 1989, Draft).
56. Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 35, at 744-45. The discussion apparently turned
in part on the question of liability to tlird parties: "The Committee did not want to
create new liability to third parties by stating a duty to keep partnership books,"
although some "[Iembers of a subcommittee were uncomfortable with the suggestion
that RUPA says you don't have to keep books and records." U.P.A. § 20 cmt. (July
13-20, 1990, Meeting Draft).
57. The February, 1990, draft incorporated language that removed the concept of
required books and records from the statutory language. U.P.A. § 20(a) (Feb. 17,
1990, Draft) ("The partnership books and records, if any, shall be kept at the princi-
pal place of business of the partnership.").
58. U.P.A. § 403(a) (1994) ("A partnership shall keep its books and records, if any,
at its chief executive office.") (emphasis added). The default location of the records
has also changed from "the principal place of business of the partnership" under the
Uniform Partnership Act, U.P.A. § 19 (1969), to the partnership's "chief executive
office" under the Revised Act, U.P.A. § 403(a) (1994). The chief executive office con-
cept has been criticized in the context of the Revised Act choice of law rule, U.P.A. §
106 (1994), as being of doubtful operational utility, Vestal, Choice of Law, supra note
35, at 230-43. Those criticisms would apply in this context as well.
59. U.P.A. § 403 cmt, 1 (1994).
In general, a partnership should, at a minimum, keep those books and
records necessary to enable the partners to determine their share of the
profits and losses, as well as their rights on withdrawal. An action for an
accounting provides an adequate remedy in the event adequate records are
not kept The partnership must also maintain any books and records
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Previously, I criticized the Uniform Partnership Act for not
defining the class of "books" to which the partners were guaran-
teed access.' Several definitions have been suggested."' Both
the ABA advisory committee and the Conference drafters wanted
to expand the universe to which access is provided,62 but neither
wanted to have a listing of what constitutes books and records.'
Thus the Revised Act continues the practice of not defining the
universe for access.' The minimal guidance provided comes
from the substitution of the term "books and records" in the
Revised Act for the term "books" in the existing law65 and from
the commentary.66
The Uniform Partnership Act is unclear as to whether the
parties could ex ante restrict access to partnership books and
records. Whereas the statute clearly provides that "every partner
shall at all times have access to and may inspect and copy any
required by state or federal taxing or other governmental authorities.
Id.
60. Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 743-44.
61. One treatise focuses on the partnership books as tax records. BROMBERG, supra
note 54, § 66, at 383. The ABA advisory committee read § 19 somewhat more broad-
ly, synonymous with "financial records." ABA Report, supra note 13, at 149. The
Conference drafters apparently adopted this reading. See U.P.A. § 403 cmt. 1 (1994)
("[Section 403(a)] continues the UPA Section 19 rule, modified to include partnership
records other than its 'books,' i.e., financial records.").
62. ABA Report, supra note 13, at 149 (stating that "this section should be ex-
panded to cover other records as well [as financial records]"); U.P.A. § 403 cmt. 1
(1994).
63. ABA Report, supra note 13, at 149; U.P.A. § 403 cmt. 1 (1994).
64. U.P.A. § 101 (1994) (containing no general definition of books and records); id.
§ 403 (containing no Article 4 definition of books and records).
65. Compare U.P.A. § 19 (1969) ("books") with U.P.A. § 403 (1994) ("books and
records").
66. U.P.A. § 403 cmt. 1 (1994). The commentary is somewhat unclear on this
point. Revised Act § 403(a) "continues the UPA Section 19 rule, modified to include
partnership records other than its 'books,' i.e., financial records." Id. No guidance is
provided as to whether the phrase "i.e., financial records" clarifies "partnership re-
cords" or "books." If the former, the commentary might signal a move from the old
regime, which included books but not financial records, to the new one, which in-
cludes books and financial records but not more. If the latter, the commentary might
signal a move from the old regime, which included both books and financial records,
to the new regime, which includes other, non-financial records. The latter reading is
in accord with the interpretation of the term "partnership books" and the recommen-
dation for change in the original ABA commentary. See ABA Report, supra note 13,
at 149.
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[partnership books], 6 7 it is not clear whether the partners may
waive by agreement the protections afforded by the statutory
section.68 The Revised Act answers this question-at least in
part. The partners may not agree to "unreasonably restrict the
right of access to books and records under Section 403(b)." 9
This limitation is a significant deviation from the contractarian
approach.?° The Revised Act does not define a core of partner-
ship information as to which restrictions on partner access would
be prohibited although the commentary indicates that an unde-
fined core of information exists as to which restrictions on access
are per se unreasonable.7' Nor is the existing statute clear that a
partner can be required to demonstrate a proper purpose before
gaining access to partnership books.72 The Revised Act continues
67. U.P.A. § 19 (1969).
68. Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 743-46. If all of § 19 is subject to modifi-
cation by agreement of the partners, then the clause "subject to any agreement be-
tween the partners," which modifies the default provision specifying the location at
which partnership books are to be kept, is surplusage. If the clause is not surplusage,
then the fact that there is no parallel clause in the inspection provision could be
taken to indicate that the inspection clause is not subject to modification by the
partners. But see People v. Phillips, 137 N.Y.S.2d 697, 699 (Sup. Ct. 1955) ("Each
partner has equal rights to the partnership books unless there is a contrary
agreement.").
69. U.P.A. § 103(b)(2) (1994). One restriction from the existing provision is includ-
ed in the Revised Act default provision. Under the existing statute, access is provided
"at all times," but under the Revised Act, access is provided only "during ordinary
business hours." Compare U.P.A. § 19 (1969) with U.P.A. § 403(b) (1994). The differ-
ence could be significant where one partner charges another with improper access to
partnership records. Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 722-23 (discussing DuPont-
HEM dispute over Ampligen records).
70. Professor Ribstein's commentary is that "RUPA. .. senselessly invalidates
agreements that 'unreasonably restrict the right of access to books and records."'
Ribstein, Prime Time, supra note 3, at 51.
71. U.P.A. § 403 cmt. 2 (1994).
Under Section 103(b)(2), a partner's right of access to partnership
books and records may not be unreasonably restricted by the partnership
agreement. Thus, to preserve a partner's core information rights despite
unequal bargaining power, an agreement- limiting a partner's right to
inspect and copy partnership books and records is subject to judicial re-
view. Nevertheless, reasonable restrictions on access to partnership books
and records by agreement are authorized. For example, a provision in a
partnership agreement denying partners access to the compensation of
other partners qhould be upheld, absent any abuse such as fraud or du-
ress.
Id. (emphasis added).
72. Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 724. At common law there was a proper
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the practice of not requiring a partner to demonstrate a proper
purpose prior to accessing partnership books and records. 3
Is the Revised Act treatment of partnership books and records
a success? The section would benefit from a definition of "part-
nership books and records," a requirement that the partnership
maintain a core of information, and tighter restriction of modifi-
cations of the statutory provisions. The definition should differ-
entiate between the core partnership information required to be
retained and non-core information which, although not required
to be maintained, is maintained in fact. The partnership should
be required to maintain the core information, denominated the
"required partnership books and records," but not the non-core
information, denominated the "optional partnership books and
records." The partners should be free to limit access to non-core
information by modifying the statutory default but should be
precluded from modifying either the definition of core informa-
tion or the right of access to such information. These changes
would be straightforward."
purpose test for access to partnership books. BROMBERG, supra note 54, § 66, at 385
n.31. But such a requirement is not provided in the statutory language of the Uni-
form Partnership Act. See U.P.A. § 19 (1969). This standard contrasts with some
other business organization statutes. See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
16.02(b)-(c) (1989) (requiring good faith and proper purpose to examine certain non-
core records); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 220(b) (requiring and defining a proper pur-
pose for examination of corporate books and records); UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 305 (1985) (requiring a just and reasonable qualification for non-core informa-
tion).
73. Compare U.P.A. § 403 cmt. 2 (1994) with U.P.A. § 19 (1969). However, the
partnership is not powerless to prevent the improper use of the information so ob-
tained. See U.P.A. § 403 cmt. 2 (1994).
[The] right to inspect and copy the partnership's books and records
is not conditioned on the partner's purpose or motive .... A partner's
unlimited personal liability justifies an unqualified right of access to the
partnership books and records. An abuse of the right to inspect and copy
might constitute a violation of the obligation of good faith and fair deal-
ing for which the other partners would have a remedy.
Id. (citing §§ 404(d), 405). This provision is consistent with the practice under the
existing law. See BROMBERG, supra note 54, § 66, at 385 n.31. "'[The inspecting]
partner's rights are not absolute. He may be restrained from using the information
gathered from inspection for other than partnership purposes."' Id. (quoting
Sanderson v. Cooke, 175 N.E. 518 (N.Y. 1931)).
74. A good starting point for developing the required definition would be to dif-
ferentiate between partnership books and records that are required for the partner-
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B. The Revised Act Section 403(c)(1) Non-demand-Driven
Disclosure Requirement Is Appropriate and Should Be Made
Unamendable
Unlike the Uniform Partnership Act, the Revised Act contains
an affirmative disclosure mechanism for information required for
the partnership to function:
(c) Each partner and the partnership shall furnish to a
partner, and the legal representative of a deceased partner or
partner under legal disability:
(1) without demand, any information concerning the
partnership's business and affairs reasonably required for the
proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the
ship to prepare tax returns and financial statements and those other books and re-
cords which, although not required, are in fact kept. Such a definition, which would
be added to the general definitions in Revised Act § 101, might read:
"[Pjartuership books and records" means (a) the media containing any
information required by applicable statutes, rules, regulations, GAAP, or
the partnership agreement, or required for the preparation of the
partnership's tax returns or financial statements, including all information
on any supporting or explanatory schedules and notes, and all information
required to support, clarify or call into question such tax returns and
financial statements (the "required partnership books and records"), to-
gether with (b) the media containing any information maintained in fact
within the partnership's control in addition to that set forth under (a)
(the "optional partnership books and records"); subject in either case to
destruction pursuant to a commercially reasonable documentrinformation
destruction policy of general application.
Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 35, at 760-61.
The requirement that the core information be maintained would occur at Revised
Act § 403(a). The former would read:
(a) A partnership shall ..............: 'd ::i.. i::i
4 , and , i:ds: aii keep bo.- its qii"4 'nd" i i i
books and records,- i-ai at its chief executive office.
The final step is to preclude modifications of the defintion and the requirement that
core information be maintained. This would occur at § 103(b)(2):
(b) A partnership agreement may not:
of access to optional .n..'hi books and records under Section
403(b); ....
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partnership agreement or this [Act] .... "
This provision, which was a late addition to the Revised Act,7"
approximates the disclosure obligation derived from Uniform
Partnership Act section 18(e) by Professor Eisenberg," although
the drafters are clear that the statutory provision does not dis-
place the disclosure obligation implied in the partnership man-
agement provision."
The broad, non-demand-driven disclosure obligation in Revised
Act section 403(c)(1) is a deviation from contractarian theory.79
75. U.P.A. § 403(c)(1) (1994).
76. The non-demand-driven disclosure obligation was not incorporated into the Re-
vised Act until the draft of December 1993. Compare U.P.A. § 403(c) (1993) (no non-
demand-driven disclosure mechanism) with U.P.A. § 403(c) (Dec. 7, 1993, Draft)
("Each partner and the partnership shall furnish to a partner ... information con-
cerning the partnership to the extent reasonably demanded and, without demand, to
the extent just and reasonable."). In the following draft, and in the Revised Act as
passed by the Conference, the demand- and non-demand-driven provisions were bi-
furcated. See U.P.A. § 403(c)(1)-(2) (Jan. 18, 1994, Draft); U.P.A. § 403(c)(1)-(2)
(1994).
77. EISENBERG, supra note 44, at 42 (1987); Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at
717. The drafters embraced Professor Eisenberg's interpretation that "[tlhe effect of
Section 18(e) 'is to require that, absent contrary agreement, every partner be pro-
vided on an ongoing basis with information concerning the partnership business, and
be consulted in partnership decisions."' U.P.A. § 20 cmt. (Jan. 9, 1989, Draft).
[Revised Act Section 401(f)] is based on UPA Section 18(e), which has
been interpreted broadly to mean that, absent contrary agreement, each
partner has a continuing right to participate in the management of the
partnership and to be informed about the partnership business even if his
assent to partnership business decisions is not required.
U.P.A. § 401 cmt. 7 (1994); see also id. § 403 cmt. 3.
[Revised Act Section 403(c) paragraph (1)] is new and imposes an affir-
mative disclosure obligation on the partnership and partners. There is no
express UPA provision imposing an affirmative obligation to disclose any
information other than the partnership books. Under some circumstances,
however, an affirmative disclosure duty has been inferred from other
sections of the Act, as well as from the fiduciary duty of good faith. Un-
der UPA Section 18(e), for example, all partners enjoy an equal right in
the management and conduct of the partnership business, absent contrary
agreement That right has been construed to require that every partner be
provided with ongoing information concerning the partnership business.
Id. (emphasis added).
78. U.P.A. § 403 cmt. 3 (1994). "Subsection [403](c) is a significant revision of
UPA Section 20 and provides a more comprehensive, although not exclusive, state-
ment of partners' rights and duties with respect to partnership information other
than books and records." Id. (emphasis added).
79. Ribstein, Prime Time, supra note 3, at 51 n.42. Discussing an earlier draft, in
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To make the departure complete, the provision should be made
unamendable, a regrettable oversight in the Conference's pro-
posed statutory scheme.'
which the commentary supported a non-demand-driven disclosure obligation as implied
in the statutory provisions governing participation in the management of the business
and requiring good faith, but in which such an obligation was not included in the
statutory provisions, Professor Ribstein stated: "It is far from clear that disclosure
duties necessarily should be implied from these provisions . . . ." Id.
80. Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 759-60. The statutory language follows the
substance of the 1991 proposal:
All partners shall have equal rights in the management and conduct of
the partnership business, which rights shall entitle each partner to such
information from the partnership concerning the partnership business as
is reasonably required for the exercise of such rights, without any demand
by such partner.
Id. The 1991 proposal, however, called for "the insertion of a . . . clause ... stating
that a partner's right to information concerning business matters as to which the
partner has a management and conduct right... may not be varied by agreement."
Id. at 760. This oversight is corrected easily with an addition to Revised Act § 103(b)
that the partnership agreement may not "vary the right of a partner to information
concerning the partnership's business and affairs under Section 403(c)(1)." The sec-
tion should be limited to Revised Act § 403(c)(1), and not include the demand-driven
disclosure provision of § 403(c)(2), because the parties should be allowed some lati-
tude to vary the availability of partnership information not required for the proper
exercise of the partner's rights and duties.
Interestingly, although neither the non-demand-driven disclosure obligation nor
the demand-driven disclosure obligation under Revised Act § 403(c)(1) is included in
the restriction list, the access to books and records provision under Revised Act §
403(b) is included. U.P.A. § 103(b)(2) (1994) (agreement may not "unreasonably re-
strict the right of access to books and records under Section 403(b)"). The commen-
tary notes the different treatment but does not indicate the rationale behind the
policy decision. See id. § 103 cmt. 3. Professor Ribstein notes the difference in treat-
ment between the general disclosure obligation and the right of access to books and
records: "Strangely enough, RUPA does not prevent waiver of the far more basic
general disclosure provided for under RUPA § 403." Ribstein, Prime Time, supra note
3, at 51 n.43.
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C. The Revised Act Section 403(c)(2) Requirement for Disclosure
upon Demand Should Be Expanded and Procedurally Tightened
Like the Uniform Partnership Act, 1 the Revised Act contains
.a demand-driven disclosure mechanism:
(c) Each partner and the partnership shall furnish to a
partner, and to the legal representative of a deceased partner
or partner under legal disability:
(2) on demand, any.., information [other than informa-
tion concerning the partnership's business and affairs reason-
ably required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights
and duties under the partnership agreement or this [Act],
which is required to be furnished without demand under §
403(c)(1)] concerning the partnership's business and affairs,
except to the extent the demand or the information demanded
is unreasonable or otherwise improper under the circum-
stances.
8 2
The language of the Revised Act effects a narrowing of the range
of information required to be supplied in two ways. First, from
the formulation "all things affecting the partnership" under the
Uniform Partnership Act, the Revised Act retreats to the formu-
lation "information concerning the partnership's business and
affairs . . . ."" Second, the Revised Act contains an exception to
the disclosure requirement where the demand or the information
sought "is unreasonable or otherwise improper under the circum-
81. U.P.A. § 20 (1969) ("Partners shall render on demand true and full informa-
tion of all things affecting the partnership to any partner or the legal representative
of any deceased partner or partner under legal disability.").
82. U.P.A. § 403(c)(2) (1994).
83. The development of this language through the drafts of the revision illuttrates
a steady narrowing of the language. Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 755. Com-
pare U.P.A. § 20 (1969) ("true and full information of all things affecting the part-
nership") with U.P.A. § 20(c) (Feb. 14, 1990, Draft) ("true and full information con-
cerning the partnership"); U.P.A. § 403(c) (Aug. 2-9, 1991, Meeting Draft) ("complete
and accurate information concerning the partnership"); U.P.A. § 403(c) (Dec. 7, 1993,
Draft) ("information concerning the partnership"); U.P.A. § 403(c) (Jan. 18, 1994,
Draft) ("information concerning the partnership's business and affairs"); U.P.A. §
403(c) (1994) ("information concerning the partnership's business and affairs").
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stances." 4 Other differences are of limited significance.85
Three modifications of the Revised Act provisions would be
appropriate. The first would expand the universe of information
required to be provided on demand by returning the formulation
from the proposed "information concerning the partnership's
business and affairs""5 to the existing language, "information of
all things affecting the partnership.""7 The second would clarify
the procedures to be followed when a partner or the partnership
refuses to make disclosure based on an assertion that the demand
"is unreasonable or otherwise improper under the circumstanc-
es,"'88 and make it clear that the burden of persuasion rests on
the party refusing to make disclosure and not on the party de-
manding disclosure. 9 The third would restrict amendments of
84. U.P.A. § 403(c)(2) (1994). The Uniform Partnership Act does not contain such
a qualifier in the statutory language. See U.P.A. § 20 (1969). The first draft of the
Revised Act qualified the right to information, allowing the right "to the extent just
and reasonable." U.P.A. § 20(b) (Jan. 9, 1989, Draft). This formulation continued to
the December, 1993, draft when the drafters combined the right to information on
demand and the right to information without demand. See U.P.A. § 403(c) (Dec. 7,
1993, Draft) ("Each partner and the partnership shall furnish to a partner ... in-
formation concerning the partnership to the extent reasonably demanded, and,
without demand, to the extent just and reasonable."). The subsequent draft bifurcated
the provision, leaving the demand-driven component in its final form. See U.P.A.
§ 403(c)(2) (Jan. 18, 1994, Draft); U.P.A. § 403(c) (1994) ("Each partner and the
partnership shall furnish to a partner ... (2) on demand, any other information
concerning the partnership's business and affairs, except to the extent the demand or
the information demanded is unreasonable or otherwise improper under the circum-
stances.").
85. The revision includes another change. The Revised Act does not change the
universe of recipients: partners and the legal representatives of deceased partners and
partners under legal disability. The Revised Act does, however, change the universe of
people required to supply the information, broadening the obligation from "partners"
under the Uniform Partnership Act to "each partner and the partnership" under the
Revised Act. Compare U.P.A. § 20 (1969) with U.P.A. § 403(c) (1994). This change is
consistent with the move toward entity theory. See U.P.A. § 201 (1994) ("A partner-
ship is an entity . . ... "); Weidner, supra note 12, at 428-30.
86. U.P.A. § 403(c)(2) (1994).
87. U.P.A. § 20 (1969).
88. U.P.A. § 403(c)(2) (1994).
89. Revised Act § 403(c)(2) would be modified as follows:
(c) Each partner and the partnership shall furnish to a partner, and
to the legal representative of a deceased partner or partner under legal
disability:
(2) on demand, any other information .
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the demand-driven disclosure obligation, holding the partners to
a reasonableness standard parallel to that applicable to books and
records.'°
D. The Revised Act Section 404(b)(1) Statutory Accounting for
Profits Disclosure Mechanism Should Be Returned to the Existing
Temporal Scope and the Mechanism for Less-Than-Unanimous
Contemporaneous Consent Should Be Eliminated
The Revised Act contains a duty to account for profits and
benefits diverted from the partnership. 1 Because the obligation
to account is temporally diminished and substantively weakened,
this duty compares unfavorably to the accounting obligation in
the Uniform Partnership Act. 2
Under existing law, a partner is obligated to account for profits
made and benefits received without the consent of the partner-
ship during the formation, conduct, and liquidation of the part-
nership.93 In the Revised Act, the duty* to account is specifically
n tho partnnrshi'p'r b,'no~r and affahc, except to
the extent the demand or the information demanded is unreasonable or
otherwise improper under the circumstances,.'. W':'': ii.
90. U.P.A. § 103(b)(2) (1994). The partnership agreement may not "unreasonably
restrict the right of access to books and records under Section 403(b) .... Id. The
parallel change for the demand-driven disclosure obligation would be to add another
subsection to § 103(b), providing that the partnership agreement may not "unreason-
ably restrict the right to information under Section 403(c)(2) .... .
91. Id. § 404(b)(1).
(b) A partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other part-
ners is limited to the following:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any
property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and
winding up of the partnership business or derived from a use by the
partner of partnership property, including the appropriation of a partner-
ship opportunity ....
Id.
92. Compare U.P.A. § 21 (1969) with U.P.A. § 404(b)(1) (1994).
93. U.P.A. § 21(1) (1969).
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold
as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the
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limited to "the conduct and winding up of the partnership busi-
ness."94 The diminution in coverage was a result of the drafters'
general decision that it is "inappropriate" to extend fiduciary
protections to the pre-formation, negotiation period.95
UPA Section 21(1) imposes the duty on partners to account
.for profits and benefits in all transactions connected with "the
formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership." Refer-
ence to the "formation" of the partnership has been eliminat-
ed by RUPA because of concern that the duty of loyalty could
be inappropriately extended to the pre-formation period when
the parties are really negotiating at arm's length.96
For authority the drafters direct readers to compare Herring v.
Offutt" with Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Shady Grove
Plaza Limited Partnership." The comparison is not illuminating
because Herring misapplies the existing rule and Phoenix Mutual
is inapposite. Herring involved the sale of a partnership interest
by two partners to a third non-partner, in connection with which
the sellers misrepresented their cost.99 Years later, the buyer
found out about the secret profit and sued the sellers for
fraud."' Following the obligatory quotation from Cardozo's
other partners from any transaction connected with the formation, con-
duct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its
property.
Id.
94. U.P.A. § 404(b)(1) (1994). The accounting obligation also applies to profits and
benefits "derived from a use by the partner of partnership property, including the
appropriation of a partnership opportunity." Id. Although this clause is not formally
subject to the time limitation "in the conduct and winding up of the partnership
business," id., presumably the end result is the same because there can be no "part-
nership property" during the pre-formation phase.
95. Id. § 404 cmit. 2.
96. Id.
97. 295 A.2d 876 (Md. 1972).
98. 734 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1990), affld, 937 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1991).
99. In Herring, a joint venturer, Dewees, with his business associate Herring, lo-
cated a third party, Offutt to buy the joint venture interest of a deceased joint ven-
turer, Duley. Herring, 295 A.2d at 878. Offutt was told that a 24.5% interest in the
venture could be purchased for $25,000. Id. In fact, Duley's estate had a 25% inter-
est which Dewees and Herring purchased for $14,000. Having bought a 25% interest
for $14,000, Dewees and Herring sold Offutt 10% for $10,000. Id.
100. Id
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opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon, 1 the court cited section 21 of
the Maryland enactment of the Uniform Partnership Act for the
proposition that "'the principle of utmost good faith covers not
only dealings and transactions occurring during the partnership
but also those taking place during the negotiations leading to the
formation of the partnership. 10 2 The sellers had to account to
the buyer for the profit made on the resale.' °' The court in Her-
ring may have reached the right result using the wrong rule. It
appears the sellers would have liability in fraud based on their
affirmative misstatement of material fact. But U.P.A. section 21
is inapplicable because it requires an accounting to the partner-
ship, not to another partner as is the relief ordered in Her-
ring. ' 4 Neither is Phoenix Mutual on point. It involved the
failed negotiations of a real .estate developer, Shady Grove, and a
potential, equity-participant, life insurance company, Phoenix
Mutual, to set up a joint venture.' 5 After Shady Grove's prima-
ry claims were disposed of,' in the "Other Claims" section, the
court rejected in a cursory fashion Shady Grove's claim that
Phoenix Mutual breached a fiduciary duty based on an unspeci-
fied "special relationship" between the parties:
The claim.., must fail because no fiduciary duty was owed by
defendants to plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that a "special rela-
101. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928). The Maryland appellate court correctly
found that the joint venture was the equivalent of a partnership for purposes of its
analysis. Herring, 295 A.2d at 878.
102. Herring, 295 A.2d at 879 (quoting Allen v. Steinberg, 223 A.2d 240, 246 (Md.
1965)).
103. Id.
104. Nor was this transaction one involving the "formation" of the partnership. The
partnership was pre-existing; at issue in Herring was the admission of a new partner
under U.P.A. § 18(g). Nor is the common-law disclosure obligation effective in this
case. While the common law does require partners to make full disclosure when they
buy and sell partnership interests, that obligation operates only with respect to trans-
actions between existing partners. It does not require disclosure to non-partners who
are buying a partnership interest of an existing partner. Vestal, Disclosure, supra
note 38, at 730-31.
105. Phoenix Mutual, 734 F. Supp. 1183-84.
106. Shady Grove asserted "a veritable laundry list of legal theories." Id. at 1186.
Its primary theory, unsuccessful on the facts, was that a binding joint venture agree-
ment was reached. Id. part IV. Its secondary theory, also unsuccessful on the facts,
was that Phoenix Mutual breached a duty to negotiate in good faith. Id. part V.
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tionship" existed between the parties giving rise to creation of
a fiduciary duty. This contention is specious. A fiduciary rela-
tionship hardly arises when commercial parties engage in
contract negotiations. No trustee-beneficiary relationship arose
here, nor do the facts indicate that any other sort of special
relationship existed between these two negotiating parties.'
Why did the court in Phoenix Mutual, which appears to be ap-
plying Maryland law, ignore the special, fiduciary relationship
created under Uniform Partnership Act section 21 and earlier
cited (albeit wrongly) in Herring, a Maryland case? The answer is
simple:. Phoenix Mutual did not involve a diversion of a partner-
ship asset or opportunity. It involved negotiations that reached
an impasse. As such, it is questionable authority in a discussion
of whether it is appropriate to restrict temporally the obligation
to account for profits and opportunities diverted in the formation
stage. Because neither Herring nor Phoenix Mutual involve a
situation as to which U.P.A. section 21 applies, they are hardly
compelling support for the proposition that it would be "inappro-
priate" to continue application of the statutory duty to account in
the pre-formation period.
Another change relates to the role of consent. The existing act
specifically obliges a partner to account for benefits and profits
derived "without the consent of the other partners."' The case
law is clear that the Uniform Partnership Act requires the con-
sent of all the partners before a partner can take actions that
would otherwise justify an accounting.'" Up until the final
drafts, the Revised Act also included the consent qualification,
but the drafters deleted the qualification in the final drafts,"'
and it is absent from the Revised Act."' Had the drafters mere-
ly deleted the consent requirement, the partners presumably
107. Id. at 1191-92.
108. U.P.A. § 21(1) (1969).
109. See Phillips v. Kula 200, Wick Realty, Inc., 629 P.2d 119, 123 (Haw. Ct. App.
1981).
110. Compare U.P.A. § 21 (1969) (including consent provision) and U.P.A. §
404(b)(1) (1993) (including consent provision) with U.P.A. § 404(b)(1) (June 1, 1994,
Draft) (deleting consent provision) and U.P.A. § 404(b)(1) (1994) (deleting consent
provision).
111. ,U;P.A. § 404(b)(1) (1994).
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would have been free to proceed under the section that allows the
partners by unanimous agreement to "identify specific types or
categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if
not manifestly unreasonable .. ."12 The drafters went further,
however, and the consent feature reappears in another location
with a critical substantive difference:
(b) The partnership agreement may not:
(3) eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 404(b) or
603(b)(3), but:
(ii) all of the partners or a number or percentage
specified in the partnership agreement may authorize or
ratify, after full disclosure of all material facts, a specific
act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of
loyalty .... 113
The Revised Act allows parties to breach the fiduciary duty of
good faith requirement to account on the agreement of less than
all of the partners, albeit with the ex ante agreement of all the
partners:11 4 And the final jiggling of the Revised Act provisions
removes even the protection of the "manifestly unreasonable"
test in cases where the partners agree to a non-categorical viola-
tion of the duty of loyalty."5 This revision is yet another inap-
112. Id. § 103(b)(3)(i) ("[T]he partnership agreement may identify specific types or
categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly un-
reasonable . . ").
113. Id. § 103(b).
114. It must be specified in the partnership agreement if actions that would other-
wise breach the duty of loyalty may be authorized on the agreement of fewer than
all the partners. Id. § 103(b)(3)(ii). If the provision is in the partnership agreement
at organization, each partner in theory agrees (although it is far from clear that such
a provision would be an effective notice of the mischief that could be in the offing).
If the provision is added at a later date through an amendment of the partnership
agreement, the acquiescence of all the partners would be required. Id. § 401(j) ("An
act outside the ordinary course of business of a partnership and an amendment to
the partnership agreement may be undertaken only with the consent of all the part-
ners.").
115. Compare id. § 103(b)(3)(ii) (not containing manifestly unreasonable qualification
if prior authorization or ratification) with U.P.A. § 103(b)(3) (Jan. 18, 1994, Draft)
(containing manifestly unreasonable qualification for all agreements regarding duty of
loyalty violations).
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propriate diminution of the fiduciary protections afforded part-
ners under the Revised Act.
The section 404(b)(1) statutory accounting for pr6fits disclo-
sure mechanism should be modified to include pre-formation
conduct and to eliminate the mechanism for less-than-unani-
mous, contemporaneous consent of breaches of fiduciary du-
ties.1
E. The Revised Act Section 405(b) Formal Accounting Disclosure
Mechanism Appropriately Modifies the Uniform Partnership Act
Provisions and Requires No Further Modifications
The Revised Act cortains a right to a formal accounting that
differs in structure from the right to a formal accounting includ-
ed in the Uniform Partnership Act." 7 The Revised Act increases
116. The changes are straightforward. First, § 103(b)(3)(ii) should be deleted, and §
103(b)(3)(i) should be integrated into the introductory language of § 103(b)(3). Sec-
ond, § 404(b)(1) should be revised to include pre-formation conduct. This revision
would raise a problem because the language of U.P.A. § 21 does not provide for all
of the possible situations evidently meant to be covered. For example, a § 21 claim
may arise in a case where the partnership is not ultimately formed, but § 21 pro-
vides for an accounting "to the partnership." See U.P.A. § 21 (1969). On the theory
that U.P.A. § 21 has worked despite this technical defect, Revised Act § 404(b)(1)
could be slightly modified, as follows:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any
property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the ;pAicon-
duct and winding up of the partnership business or derived from a use by
the partner of partnership property, including the appropriation of a part-
nership opportunity ....
If a more technically correct revision is desired, Revised Act § 404(b)(1) could be
modified more comprehensively, as follows:
(1) to account to the partership: .....
c a_:*,": h: p .. I....I and hold as trustee for
i14 '6. thenii any property, profit, or benefit dlerived by the partner in the
fozrn'ti..i.. conduct and winding up of the partnership business or derived
from a use by the partner of partnership property, including the appropri-
ation of a partnership .:. a r opportunity ....
117. U.P.A. § 405(b) (1994).
(b) A partner may maintain an action against the partnership or
another partner for legal or equitable relief, with or without an account-
ing as to partnership business, to:
(1) enforce the partner's rights under the partnership agreement;
(2) enforce the partner's rights under this [Act] ...
(3) enforce the rights and otherwise protect the interests of the
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the availability of the formal accounting mechanism as part of a
general relaxation of impediments to partner litigation against
the partnership prior to dissolution and winding up."' The
present statute allows an accounting without dissolution in three
specific circumstances: if a partner "is wrongfully excluded from
the partnership business or possession of its property by his co-
partners,""'  if an agreement of the partners so provides, 2 °
and if triggered by a section 21 obligation.' 2 ' The Revised Act
deals with the right to an accounting as part of the legal and
equitable remedies potentially available to a partner, not as a
separate .mechanism.'22 Within that framework, the Revised Act
allows for an accounting in each of the three specific situations
contemplated by the existing statute. The existing statute pro-
vides for an accounting where one partner "is wrongfully exclud-
ed from the partnership business or possession of its property by
his co-partners."'23 The Revised Act expands this provision to
make the accounting remedy available to enforce any partner
rights under the partnership agreement and the Revised Act, not
just the right of participation.2 4 The existing statute provides
for an accounting if an agreement of the partners so pro-
partner, including rights and interests arising independently of the part-
nership relationship.
Id.
118. Compare U.P.A. § 22 (1969) with U.P.A. § 405(b) (1994).
Section 405(b) goes far beyond the UPA [§ 22] rule. It provides that,
during the term of the partnership, partners may maintain a variety of
legal or equitable actions, including an action for an accounting, as well
as a final action for an accounting upon dissolution and winding up. It
reflects a new policy choice that partners should have access to the courts
during the term of the partnership to resolve claims against the partner-
ship and the other partners, leaving broad judicial discretion to fashion
appropriate remedies.
Id. § 405 cmt. 2.
119. U.P.A. § 22(a) (1969).
120. Id. § 22(b).
121. Id. § 22(c).
122. U.P.A. § 405(b) (1994). "A partner may maintain an action against the part-
nership or another partner for legal or equitable relief, with or without an account-
ing as to partnership business . Id.
123. U.P.A. § 22(a) (1969).
124. U.P.A. § 405(b)(1)-(2) (1994).
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vides' 25 -a point presumably subsumed in the combination of
the Revised Act sections allowing an accounting to "enforce a
right under the partnership agreement,"' 26 and the expansive
definition of "partnership agreement" as "the agreement, wheth-
er written, oral, or implied, among the partners concerning the
partnership ... .12' The final specific situation allowing an ac-
counting under the existing regime is "[a]s provided by section
21. '' 128 Aside from the question of whether, strictly speaking, "a
formal account" within the meaning of section 22 ever is "provid-
ed" by the partner's obligation to account under section 21, a fair,
reading of the existing statute is that partners have a section
22(c) right to a formal accounting to determine whether a copart-
ner has breached such partner's section 21 obligation to account.
This result is achieved in the Revised Act (although in somewhat
reduced power given the temporal restriction of the underlying
obligation to account)1 9 through the combination of the fiducia-
ry duty of loyalty obligation to account 3 ° and the specific authori-
zation for an accounting to enforce the other partners' rights
under that section.' 3 '
The Revised Act contains no directly parallel provision to the
final authorization contained in the existing regime, which pro-
vides for an accounting "[w]henever other circumstances render
it just and reasonable.' 1 32 Surely, however, the combination of
the authorizations for formal accountings to protect rights under
the agreements of the parties and the Revised Act-together with
the ability to have an accounting to "enforce the rights and oth-
erwise protect the interests of the partner, including rights and
interests arising independently of the partnership relation-
125. U.P.A. § 22(b) (1969).
126. U.P.A. § 405(b)(1) (1994).
127. Id. § 101(5).
128. U.P.A. § 22(c) (1969).
129. Compare id. § 21 (obligation during formation, conduct, and liquidation of
partnership) with U.P.A. § 404(b)(1) (1994) (obligation during conduct and winding
up of partnership).
130. U.P.A. § 404(b)(1) (1994):
131. Id. § 405(b)(2)(i) (authorizing an accounting to "enforce the partner's rights
under . . . [§3 404").
132. U.P.A. § 22(d) (1969).
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ship" '-achieves the same result. Clearly, the drafters intend-
ed this outcome. 1
34
The statutory provisions dealing with the right to a formal
accounting are appropriate, and the structural change is helpful.
No special modifications of this section are required although the
modifications proposed in the following section apply to the for-
mal accounting mechanism as one of the section 405 remedies.
F. The Relationship Between the Statutory Disclosure Obligations
and the Revised Act Section 405 Remedies and Liabilities Should
Be Clarified; Preferably the Remedies and Liabilities Provisions
Should Be Made Unamendable
A major unresolved problem with the disclosure scheme of the
Revised Act is the remedies for non-compliance with the disclo-
sure obligations. Specifically, how do the rights under sections
403 and 404 fit with the remedies and liabilities under section
405? Can even the minimal protections of the Revised Act be cir-
cumvented by eliminating or impairing the remedies available to
vindicate the aggrieved partners' rights?
The analysis requires two steps, both of which turn on the
ability to amend the various sections. The first step involves the
substantive disclosure obligations. As it stands, the duty to make
available partnership books and records,'35 the fiduciary duty to
account,'36 and the non-fiduciary obligation of good faith and
fair dealing 137  are subject to some restrictions on
amendment. 3 ' The demand-driven3 9  and non-demand-
driven14' disclosure requirements are not subject to any restric-
tions on amendment.14 ' Each of these provisions should be
133. U.P.A. § 405(b)(3) (1994).
134. Id. § 405 cmt. 2; see supra note 118.
135. U.P.A. § 403(b).
136. Id. § 404(b)(1).
137. Id. § 404(d).
138. See, e.g., id. § 103(b)(2) (as to the right of access to books and records under
§ 403(b)); id. § 103(b)(3) (as to the fiduciary duty of loyalty); id. § 103(b)(5) (as to
the non-fiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing).
139. Id. § 403(c)(2).
140. Id. § 403(c)(1).
141. Neither disclosure obligation appears in the section 103(b) listing of sections as
to which amendments are restricted. See id. § 103(b).
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tightened to restrict the ability of the parties to diminish the
protections, but the prQtections would not be safe even if all
the appropriate modifications of the substantive disclosure obliga-
tions were made because of the second step, involving the lia-
bilities and remedies associated with the substantive disclosure
obligations. Again, the key is the ability to amend the statutory
sections at issue. The relevant liabilities and remedies are found
in Revised Act section 405."' The liabilities and remedies under
section 405, however, are not on the list of sections as to which
the ability of the parties to amend the statutory defaults is re-
stricted,'44 and the parties appear to be fully able to modify the
liabilities and remedies, including the formal accounting mecha-
nism.'45
This appearance is incorrect, however, and forms a significant
trap for the unwary. The intention of the drafters, notwithstand-
ing the seemingly clear language of section 103(a), is that the
provisions of any partnership agreement govern over the statu-
tory provisions except where section 103(b) otherwise provides,
and except where the liabilities and remedies of section 405 are
involved.' The statute itself gives no indication that the list of
sections as to which modifications are limited is anything but
exclusive. The drafters recognized this problem, but they were
unable to solve it in the statute.'47 If the Conference is serious
142. See supra part II.A (duty to make available partnership books and records);
supra part II.B (non-demand-driven disclosure); supra part II.C (demand-driven dis-
closure); supra part II.D (duty to account); see also Vestal, supra note 2, at 575
n.235 (arguing that obligation of good faith and fair dealing should be included with-
in fiduciary duty of loyalty).
143. U.P.A. § 405 (1994).
144. Id. § 103(b).
145. Id. § 103(a).
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), relations among the part-
ners and between the partners and the partnership are governed by the
partnership agreement. To the extent the partnership agreement does not
otherwise provide, this [Act] governs relations among the partners and
between the partners and the partnership.
Id.
146. See id. §§ 103 cmt. 1, 405 cmt. 3.
147. 1992 NATIONAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 21, at 188. One of the
reporters for the Revised Act observed to the Conference:
We have looked at that and have tried to figure out how we could go
about stating some sort of floor on remedy, and we haven't been able to
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that the section 405 remedies and liabilities are not to be fully in
play-and certainly that is the correct position, albeit not one in
accord with contractarian theory14'-at the very least some indi-
cation should be included in the statute itself, and not merely in
the comments, 49 that the power of the partners to modify the
liabilities and remedies of section 405 is limited. 5 °
If partners cannot circumvent the restrictions on modification
of the section 403 and 404 rights by eliminating the liabilities
and remedies provisions of section 405, then another basic prob-
lem arises: What are the limits of the power to amend the liabil-
ities and remedies provisions of section 405? It is important at
this point to remember that the section 103(b) restrictions on the
power to modify specified statutory provisions are not uni-
form. 1' Although provisions not listed in section 103(b) are
fully amendable (albeit with the "implicit listing" of section 405),
find a way. We decided to leave it to comment to say something that
would reflect the policy you've just stated.
Id.
148. Ribstein, Prime Time, supra note 3, at 62 n.125. Professor Ribstein notes the
apparent inconsistency in declaring the § 405 remedies of limited amenability while
not including them in the § 103(b) listing. He also argues that, "[c]ontrary to the
implication of the Comment 3 to § 405, it does not follow from the fact that a duty
is mandatory that all aspects of the remedy also are mandatory." Id. His solution is
simple: "the statute should make clear that partners can contract to limit remedies."
Id. at 62.
149. The use of the commentary in this manner is troublesome. It almost certainly
fails to provide adequate notice to the bench and bar, in part because the
Conference's official commentary is rarely adopted by enacting legislatures. Vestal,
Choice of Law, supra note 38, at 245 nn.110-11, 246 n.112 (discussing treatment of
commentary to the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act by enacting states). Ad-
ditionally, the use of the commentary in this way appears to violate the Conference's
own guidelines. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
1991-92 REFERENCE BOOK, DRAFrING RULES FOR UNIFORM OR MODEL ACTS 81 (1991)
("Comments should not be used as a substitute for or to modify any substantive
provision in an Act.").
150. Such a change would be easily accomplished by adding a new paragraph to
subsection 103(b), making reference to § 405, although the exact language of the new
paragraph would depend upon the content of the restriction, discussed in infra part
II.G. The suggestion, to add a statutory reference to the restrictions on modification
of the liabilities and remedies under § 405, was made during the 1992 floor debate.
1992 NATIONAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 21, at 188-89. Note that such
a change would not protect the non-demand-driven disclosure obligation because it is
codified at § 403, not § 405.
151. Vestal, Compromise, supra note 38, part II.
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the obverse (that provisions listed in section 103(b) are flatly
unamendable) is not true. Section 103(b) differentiates between
statutory provisions that (1) cannot be varied,'52 (2) cannot be
unreasonably restricted, 5' (3) cannot be unreasonably re-
duced,' (4) cannot be eliminated,'55 and (5) cannot be re-
stricted.'56 How should modifications of the section 405 provi-
sions be restricted to follow appropriately, the different treat-
ments of the amenability of section 403 and 404 rights?
The commentary is ambiguous on this point. The commentary
to-section 405 states: "Generally, partners may limit or contract
away their Section 405 remedies. They may not, however, elimi-
nate entirely the remedies for breach of those duties which are
mandatory under Section 103(b)."'57 This implicit restriction of
the modification right is restated, with an important difference,
in the commentary to section 103:
The general rule under Section 103(a) is that relations
among the partners and between the partners and the part-
nership are governed by the partnership agreement. See Sec-
tion 101 (5). To the extent that the partners fail to agree upon
a contrary rule, RUPA provides the default rule. Only the
rights and duties listed in Section 103(b), and implicitly the
corresponding liabilities and remedies under Section 405, are
mandatory and cannot be waived or varied by agreement be-
yond what is authorized. Those are the only exceptions to the
general principle that the provisions of RUPA with respect to
the rights of the partners inter se are merely default rules,
subject to modification by the partners.""8
The difference between the first formulation, that the remedy
may not be eliminated, and the second, that the remedy may not
be varied beyond what is authorized, is significant.
152. U.P.A. § 103(b)(1), (6), (7), (8) (1994).
153. Id. § 103(b)(2) ("A partnership agreement may not . . . unreasonably restrict
the right of access to books and records under Section 403(b) . . ").
154.,, Id. § 103(b)(4) ("A partnership agreement may not . . . unreasonably reduce
the duty of care under Section 404(c) or 603(b)(3) ... .
155. Id. §§ 103(b)(3), (5).
156. Id. § 103(b)(9) ("A partnership agreement may not . . . restrict rights of third
parties under this [Act].").
157. Id. § 405 cmt. 3.
158. Id. § 103 cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
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The challenge, then, is how to tie the permissible range of
modifications of the liabilities and remedies provisions to the
different permissible ranges of modifications of the duties provi-
sions.'59 There are several possibilities. The grossest treatment
would be to adopt the suggestion in the commentary to section
405 and to establish a "lowest common denominator" rule.16°
Under this approach, the statute merely would guarantee against
the complete elimination of all liabilities and all remedies where
the partner's claim is based on a substantive right, the modifica-
tion of which is restricted under section 103.161 This treatment
would, under the structure of section 103, provide wholly inad-
equate protection for partners.16
2
A somewhat more targeted approach would be to adopt the
suggestion in the commentary to section 103 and establish an
"authorized variation" rule.3 Under this approach, the statute
would limit contractual modifications of liabilities and remedies
159. One of the reporters for the Revised Act recognized this problem in the floor
discussion on point:
Mr. Donald J. Weidner (Reporter): ... I think what you're talking
about is whether we should include in Section 103 some sort of qualifica-
tion to both 405 and 406. . . . The problem you get into in drafting is
that in 103 there is fairly carefully chosen language with respect to the
various rights-that is to say, in some cases, we may not vary a right; in
other cases, you may not eliminate the right. And in some of the sections
we have qualified further. We have said you may not eliminate the right,
but you may do something-you may hobble it [a] little bit.
1992 NATIONAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 21, at 187-88.
160. U.P.A. § 405 cmt. 3 (1994). "Generally, partners may limit or contract away
their Section 405 remedies. They may not, however, eliminate entirely the remedies
for breach of those duties which are mandatory under Section 103(b)." Id.
161. The language to implement this approach would be a straightforward addition
to § 103:
(b) A partnership agreement may not:
162. Such a treatment would, however, be consistent with the weak treatment of
essential fiduciary duties under the Revised Act. Vestal, supra note 2, at 556-59. The
weakest limitation on modification, the prohibition on elimination, applies to both the
fiduciary duty of loyalty, U.P.A. § 103(b)(3) (1994), and the non-fiduciary obligation
of good faith and fair dealing, id. § 103(b)(5).
163. Id. § 103 cmt. 1 ("[The) liabilities and remedies under Section 405 [correspond-
ing to rights and duties listed in section 103(b)] ... are mandatory and cannot be
waived or varied by agreement beyond what is authorized.").
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to the same authorized variations of the statutory defaults as are
available for the underlying substantive rights.64
Both the lowest common denominator and authorized variation
approaches have serious deficiencies. By tying the ability to re-
strict remedies and liabilities to the ability to modify substantive
rights, both approaches allow unlimited weakening of remedies
and liabilities as related to sections not listed in section 103(b).
Consider the situation where a partner is in fact excluded from
participation in the management of the partnership, notwith-
standing that the partnership agreement does not vary the statu-
tory default that "[e]ach partner has equal rights in the manage-
ment and conduct of the partnership business." '165 The participa-
tion section is not listed in section 103(b) as a section as to which
the partners' ability to modify the statutory default is limited.
The partners could have agreed to exclude one of their number
from participation, although in the example they did not do so.
Both the lowest common denominator and authorized variation
approaches suggest that because the partnership agreement could
have contained a complete exclusion on participation, it also
could include a complete exclusion of liability and remedies.166
Of course, a fully knowledgeable partner would never agree to
such a provision, but the world is full of people who read the
"important" substantive provisions, if they read the agreement at
all, and never get to the "boilerplate" remedies sections of the
agreement. The contractarians label concern for such individuals
"parentalistic."' 67
The authorized variation approach introduces a new dimension
164. The language to implement this approach would be a different addition to
§ 103(b):
(b) A partnership agreement may not-
165. U.P.A. § 401(f) (1994).
166. See id. § 103 cmt. 1 ("Only the rights and duties listed in Section 103(b), and
implicitly the corresponding liabilities and remedies under Section 405, are mandatory
and cannot be waived or varied by agreement beyond what is authorized."); id. § 405
cmt. 3 ("[Partners] may not . . . eliminate entirely the remedies for breach of those
duties which are mandatory under Section 103(b).").
167. Weidner, supra note 12, at 454.
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of complexity by tying restrictions on modifications of liabilities
and remedies to the various levels of restriction already included
in section 103(b) for the underlying rights and duties provisions.
Of course, there is no problem as to those provisions that cannot
be varied168 because the remedies also would be beyond modifica-
tion. Using the same method, the partnership agreement could
not "unreasonably restrict" remedies for partners denied access
to books and records'69 or "unreasonably reduce" remedies for
partners having claims based on the fiduciary duty of care. 7 °
These formulations may be reasonable, requiring the courts to
make case-by-case determinations as to what is reasonable. But it
seems no protection at all to say that as to breaches of the fidu-
ciary duty of loyalty and the non-fiduciary obligation of good
faith and fair dealing, the partnership agreement is limited only
to the extent that it may not wholly eliminate the remedies pro-
vided in section 405."'1 To complicate matters further, the court
would need to consider the impact in the remedy calculation of
the language that "the partnership agreement may identify spe-
cific types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty
of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable,"'72 and that "the part-
nership agreement may prescribe the standards by which the
performance of the obligation [of good faith and fair dealing] is to
be measured, if the standards are not manifestly
unreasonable."'7 3 These passages may impose a "manifestly
unreasonable" test on the restriction of liabilities and reme-
dies-another indication of the problems caused by the basic
formulation of fiduciary duties undei7 the Revised Act."7 4
Both approaches run into difficulty when faced with multiple
claims arising from the same factual situation. Consider our last
illustration-a partner improperly excluded from partnership
168. U.P.A. § 103(b)(1), (6), (7), (8) (1994).
169. Id. § 103(b)(2).
170. Id. § 103(b)(4).
171. Id. §§ 103(b)(3), (5).
172. Id. § 103(b)(3)(i).
173. Id. § 103(b)(5).
174. The final part of the analysis is moot because § 103(b) provides that "[a] part-
nership agreement may not . . . restrict rights of third parties under this [Act]," id.
§ 103(b)(9), but § 405 does not create any remedies for non-partners, id. § 405.
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operations. In addition to being excluded from the partnership
business, such a partner typically may be denied access to the
books, and the co-partners may pilfer partnership profits. If the
partnership agreement limits remedies to the extent possible
under the commentary, what result? Under either approach, the
partnership agreement could eliminate any remedy for the ex-
clusion from participation. Under the lowest common denomina-
tor approach, the partnership agreement could modify the reme-
dies and liabilities for the denial of access to the books and re-
cords, and for the breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty in the
failure to account for the diverted profits, but it would be pre-
vented from eliminating such provisions. Under the authorized
variation approach, the partnership agreement could not "unrea-
sonably restrict" the remedy for a denial of access to the books
and records, or "eliminate" the remedy for the breach of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty in the failure to account for the diverted
profits. Under either approach, courts could have to consider
separate limitations on remedies for each claim-a cumbersome
approach.
Better than the lowest common denominator or authorized
variation approaches, although conceptually complicated, would
be an approach that tied variations in the liabilities and remedies
under section 405 to changes actually made from the statutory
defaults with respect to the underlying rights and powers giving
rise to the claims. This approach would solve the problem of how
to treat sections that are fully amendable under section 103(a),
such as the right of participation, but are not modified, or are
modified in insubstantial ways, in the specific case at issue.175
This approach would not eliminate the challenge in dealing with.
multiple claims, and it would exponentially complicate the chal-
lenge of linking changes in the underlying rights and powers and
175. The language to implement this approach would be a different addition to
§ 103(b):
(b) A partnership agreement may not:
gr e .-extent tha a t .........ct~.. . .... .....  . . . . .(h~to he uh~autra ighs i Tht pn h~h~i~et iin Vy: l
~~ei ~ ... lannn at~I
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changes in the corresponding liabilities and remedies by requiring
the courts to define equivalents, not for the five levels of permis-
sible statutory variation 76 but for the infinite number of possi-
ble contractual variations.
The best approach would be simply to add the liabilities and
remedies section to the list of provisions made unamendable,"'
thus equalizing the treatment of liabilities and remedies for sec-
tions listed and not listed in section 103(a) and leaving section
405 intact. At the same time, such an approach would permit the
partners to liquidate damages and otherwise limit remedies sub-
ject to other law, while allowing courts the benefit of existing
caselaw on point.17
G. The Revised Act Abandonment of Classes of Partnership-
Related Claims Historically Within the Operation of Partnership
Law Should Be Reversed
The Revised Act bifurcates the world historically within the
scope of common law and statutory partnership law. Some part-
176. U.P.A. § 103(b) (1994). This provision differentiates between sections that can-
not be varied, id. § 103(b)(1), (6), (7), (8), cannot be unreasonably restricted, id. §
103(b)(2), cannot be unreasonably reduced, id. § 103(b)(4), cannot be eliminated, id. §
103(b)(3), (5), and cannot be restricted, id. § 103(b)(9).
177. The language to implement this approach would be the simplest addition to
§ 103:
(b) A partnership agreement may not:
178. This is apparently the result the drafters desired:
Commissioner Miller: ... the way I read 405, and I think 406, and
their comments, is that we may in fact be able to back door, since 405
and 406 are waivable by agreement, whatever we seek to achieve in
404 . ..
Mr. Donald J. Weidner (Reporter): We discussed this issue, and I
think what you're talking about is whether we should include in Section
103 some sort of qualification to both 405 and 406. And the committee
view on it was that whenever there is a mandatory right in the act, that
the remedies appropriate under 406 to pursue that right would be avail-
able and not waivable, you couldn't eliminate through the back door the
right by eliminating all the remedies. And the understanding was that, for
example, if you had a liquidated damages clause for breach of a partner-
ship agreement that gave you a dollar settlement, that would be unen-
forceable by the general law of penalty.
1992 NATIONAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 21, at 187-88.
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nership-related claims continue to be deemed partnership situa-
tions and will continue to be handled by partnership law. Other
partnership-related claims are deemed "arms length" transac-
tions and will be handled by non-partnership law. Thus the Re-
vised Act removes the conduct of the parties in the pre-formation
stage,'79 the conduct of partners transacting business with the
partnership,8 ' and the conduct of partners selling interests in
the partnership among themselves 8 ' from the partnership-law
regime and treats them as arms-length interchanges no longer
subject to partnership-specific law.
1. The Issue of Whether To Reduce the Protections for
Aggrieved Partners Was Not Debated Adequately or Resolved
Properly
This change results in a clear diminution of protection for
aggrieved parties from that available under the existing re-
gime."' Whether this diminution is appropriate is debat-
able.'83 A fair reading of the official commentary and the Con-
ference deliberations suggests that the amount of the decrease in
protection was not always clearly understood. For example, when
dealing with the exclusion of the pre-formation period from the
operation of the Revised Act, the commentary notes the exclusion
but does not flag the diminution in protection:
Reference to the "formatibn" of the partnership has been
179. The Revised Act's non-fiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing oper-
ates only as to the discharge of duties under the Revised Act or the partnership
agreement, and the exercise of rights. U.P.A. § 404(d) (1994). The predicate duty to
account, as part of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, is inapplicable to the formation
period. Id. § 404(b)(1).
180. Id. § 404(f).
181. These transactions are excluded because they are not within the artificial for-
mulation of partnership fiduciary duties contained in § 404(a) and (b) of the Revised
Act.
182. Vestal, supra note 2, at 546-49.
183. I do not believe it is appropriate to exclude pre-formation conduct from the
oversight of the act. See id. at 555-56. This pre-formation disclosure obligation has
been identified as a notable departure of partnership law from ordinary contract law,
one which properly could be classified as mandatory. Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary
Obligation Under Intellectual Siege: Contemporary Challenges to the Duty To Be Loy-
al, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 471, 475, 485-86 (1992).
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eliminated by RUPA because of concern that the duty of loyal-
ty could be inappropriately extended to the pre-formation
period when the parties are really negotiating at arm's
length.... Once a partnership is agreed to, each partner be-
comes a fiduciary in the "conduct" of the business. Pre-forma-
tion negotiations are, of course, subject to the general contract
obligation to deal honestly and without fraud. 84
The commentary does not make clear that the quantum of pro-
tection available to parties in the pre-partnership phase is sig-
nificantly less than that available after partnership formation. An
example of the diminution of protection found in the Revised Act
comes in the treatment of good faith and fair dealing where a
partner transacts business with the partnership. Under the exist-
ing regime, the common-law disclosure obligation of partners is
effective during the period the transaction is negotiated.8 5 Un-
der the Revised Act, however, "the rights and obligations of the,
partner [transacting business with the partnership] are the same
as those of a person who is not a partner, subject to other appli-
cable law."' 8  But "other applicable law" provides diminished
protection: Neither the Uniform Commercial Code good faith
requirement8 7 nor the Restatement duty of good faith and fair
dealing' is effective during the period of negotiation. Presum-
184. U.P.A. § 404 cmt. 2 (1994).
185. Vestal, supra note 2, at 555; Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 732.
186. U.P.A. § 404(f) (1994).
187. The Uniform Commercial Code good faith obligation, by its terms, does not
apply during the negotiation of a contract otherwise covered by the Code. See, e.g.,
Whorley v. First Westside Bank, 485 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Neb. 1992) (no U.C.C. good
faith claim where contractual relationship not established). But one could argue that
application of a subjective good faith standard in the context of a partnership rela-
tionship would create an ongoing obligation to disclose prior to the performance of
the contract such that performance of the contract by the knowledgeable partner
would be a violation of the U.C.C. § 1-203 good faith in performance requirement.
One could also construct a case where a partner would acquire knowledge after the
contract had been entered into, but in advance of performance, thus triggering a
U.C.C. § 1-203 obligation to disclose.
188. Like U.C.C. § 1-203, Restatement § 205 does not, by its terms, apply to the
negotiation phase of a contractual relationship. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 205 cmt. c (1979). One might argue, however, that the good faith and fair
dealing obligation set forth in the Restatement applies to the knowledgeable partner
not by virtue of the contract for the purchase and sale of the specific asset which is
being negotiated, but rather by virtue of the partnership agreement, which is after
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ably the Revised Act's drafters would not see this gap in coverage
as a problem; this contraction of protection for partners is consis-
tent with the temporally narrow coverage of the Revised Act's
non-fiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing'89 and
with the general contraction of intra-partnership fiduciary
protections under the Revised Act. 9 ' To the extent the com-
mentary and discussions surrounding adoption finesse this point,
the issue has not been debated adequately.
Some indication of the inadequate nature of the consideration
given the shift to reliance on non-partnership-specific law is
found in an exchange between one of the ABA advocates and a
commissioner at the 1992 annual meeting:
Mr. Ed. Merrill (ABA): [I]t was generally felt that pre-for-
mation of the partnership, that the parties should be treated
as dealing with arm's lengths and that other law, such as
fraud in the inducement and other contract related principles,
would cover the period where a person is induced into the
partnership on the basis of fraud.
Commissioner Stern: Well, yes. But for fraud to operate,
there has to be some information given.
Mr. Merrill: Concealment-intentional concealment to in-
duce conduct I think is actionable fraud.
Commissioner Stern: Okay.'
The exchange misses an important distinction. Intentional con-
cealment and non-disclosure are not the same thing. Simply stat-
ed, concealment, without more, is the equivalent of assertion;
all a contract between the partners. Such an argument should fail for two reasons.
First, a contract to purchase an asset from the partnership is not made in perfor-
mance or enforcement of the partnership agreement, and thus the Restatement obli-
gation is irrelevant. Second, the Revised Act clearly intended to exclude the partner-
ship-status-based statutory good faith and fair dealing obligation in the situation
where a partner is transacting business with the partnership. See U.P.A. § 404(f)
(1994) ("[T]he rights and obligations of the partner [who transacts business with the
partnership] are the same as those of a person who is not a partner, subject to other
applicable law."). It would seem inappropriate to impose a common-law obligation of
good faith and fair dealing on the knowledgeable partner on the basis of the contract
of partnership.
189. U.P.A. § 404(d) (1994).
190. Vestal, supra note 2, at 534, 555-56.
191. 1992 NATIONAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 21, at 137-38.
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non-disclosure, without more, is not.192 Under the current re-
gime non-disclosure is actionable; the hggrieved party need not
show intentional concealment. The drafters' reliance on fraud is
misplaced further because, although non-disclosure short of in-
tentional concealment can support a'claim for relief, such a reme-
dy is not the equivalent of the protections provided partners un-
der the existing regime. Non-disclosure of a material fact is
equivalent to assertion only in certain well-defined cases.193
Non-disclosure of a material fact can be equivalent to assertion
even for individuals not in a relation of trust and confidence, but
the standard typically applicable in the negotiation context both
creates substantial proof problems and gives the aggrieved part-
ner materially diminished protection.'94 This reduction in an
192. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 160 (1979) ("Action intended
or known to be likely to prevent another from learning a fact is equivalent to an
assertion that the fact does not exist.") with id. § 161 ("A person's non-disclosure of
a fact known to him is equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist in the
following cases only: ... ."). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550
(1976) ("One party to a transaction who by concealment or other action intentionally
prevents the other from acquiring material information is subject to the same liability
to the other, for pecuniary loss as though he had stated the nonexistence of the
matter that the other was thus prevented from discovering.") with id. § 551 ("One
who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the other
to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the same liability
to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the matter that he
has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to the other to exercise rea-
sonable care to disclose the matter in question.") (emphasis added).
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 551 (1976). Prospective partners have a status-based obligation to dis-
close under the present regime. Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 727-35; see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(d) (1979) ("A person's non-disclosure of a
fact known to him is equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist in the
following cases only: . . . (d) where the other person is entitled to know the fact
because of a relation of trust and confidence between them."). The co-agency partner-
ship relationship, as historically defined, and the relationship of joint adventurers, are
such relations of trust and confidence. Id. at § 161 cmt. f; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976) ("One party to a business transaction is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummat-
ed, (a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a fiducia-
ry or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them . . . .") The part-
nership relationship is such a relation of trust and confidence. See id. at § 551 cmt. f.
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b) (1979).
A person's non-disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an
assertion that the fact does not exist in the following cases only: . . . (b)
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aggrieved partner's access to a potential remedy is precisely the
shift, from status as partner to status as third party, the Revised
Act's drafters propose.'95 Having made the change, and having
specifically argued against status-based, fiduciary duties, the
proponents of the Revised Act should articulate clearly that
protections equivalent to those based on partnership status will
not be available to aggrieved partners under the proposed regime.
2. The Revised Act's Reliance on Non-Partnership Law Is
Misplaced
Beyond the question of whether the policy issue of the diminu-
tion in protection has been debated adequately and resolved prop-
erly, the new regime fails to aadress questions of how, and how
well, the "other applicable law" of "arms length" transactions
will be applied in the context of situations heretofore handled
under partnership-specific law. The Revised Act's abandonment
of jurisdiction over significant partnership-related situations
might be justified if the other applicable law constitutes a well-
defined body of law that can be applied without significant modi-
fication. But the body of law to which recourse is being made
fails on both counts; it is neither well-defined nor capable of
being applied intact.
Consider the three situations the Revised Act removes from
operation of the partnership-law-based disclosure obligation: pre-
where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the
other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is making the
contract and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in
good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.
Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1976).
One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise rea-
sonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummat-
ed,....
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about
to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because
of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other ob-
jective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.
Id.
195. U.P.A. § 404(f) (1994) ("A partner may lend money to and transact other busi-
ness with the partnership, and as to each loan or transaction, the rights and obliga-
tions of the partner are the same as those of a person who is not a partner, subject
to other applicable law.").
1995] 1603
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
formation negotiations, negotiations for business transactions
between a partner and the partnership, and sales of partnership
interests among partners. Of course, some elements of the gen-
eral regime are relatively settled. Fraud remedies may be avail-
able in cases involving affirmative misstatement or active con-
cealment of material fact. But fraud remedies are not available in
the hard-and one must assume much more common--case of
simple non-disclosure. In the general regime there are remedies
for violation of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing, but
such remedies are available only as to the performance, not the
negotiation, of contracts. In general, there is no obligation to
disclose in arms length negotiations between non-fiduciary par-
ties.'98 However, the nature and extent of the exceptions to that
general rule are the subject of ongoing debate. The information
disclosure duties that are owed in "arms length" business trans-
actions is far from settled.19
7
One vehicle for the continuing debate is the unilateral mistake
doctrine-the applicable rule where one party, but not the other,
possesses information relevant to the transaction. Plausible mis-
take scenarios could arise for each of the three areas that the
Revised Act excludes from the operation of partnership-specific
law. Smith is negotiating with Jones to form a small business; it
is agreed that Smith will contribute a truck she owns and Jones
will contribute cash. Jones proposes valuing the truck at the
wholesale bluebook value for a truck of that year, model, and
mileage. Smith agrees to the valuation without disclosing that the
truck has a cracked cylinder head, uses oil at a prodigious rate,
and needs extensive engine repairs. Smith does not make any
affirmative statements about the condition of the truck; neither
does she actively conceal the problems. Change the facts slightly,
so that Smith is selling the truck to the partnership after forma-
tion or selling her partnership interest to Jones where the ailing
196. Deborah A. DeMott, Do You Have the Right to Remain Silent?: Duties of Dis-
closure in Business Transactions, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 65, 65 (1994) ("To a consider-
able extent, parties who deal at arm's length are free to take a sporting view of
their relationship with each other."). Professor DeMott correctly notes that parties
who contemplate forming a partnership are treated as fiduciaries under the existing
regime. Id.
197. Id.
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truck is a partnership asset, and the three excluded situations are
covered. Does Smith have an obligation to disclose?
Under the existing partnership-law-based regime the answer is
clear: In all three permutations, the knowledgeable partner,
Smith in our example, has an obligation to disclose.198 Under
the proposed non-partnership-law-based regime the answer is not
at all clear.
Dean Anthony Kronman differentiates between situations
where non-disclosure is allowed and where disclosure is required
on the basis of the cost of acquisition of the information at is-
sue.'99 The "social interest in efficiency" is served, he suggests,
when parties are not required to disclose "socially useful informa-
tion" that is developed at a cost to the possessor because by re-
quiring disclosure the law discourages the production of such
information." ° When such information is produced without ef-
fort, Dean Kronman observes, a disclosure requirement can be
socially efficient because it will not discourage the production of
socially useful information.2 °"
198. Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 727-35.
199. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Con-
tracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (1978).
200. Id. ("Where non-disclosure is permitted .. . the knowledge involved is typically
the product of a costly search."). "[A]lilocative efficiency is best served by permitting
one who possesses deliberately acquired information to enter and enforce favorable
bargains without disclosing what he knows." Id. at 17. "In the cases permitting non-
disclosure, [an allocation of the risk of unilateral mistake to the party with knowl-
edge) would .. . eliminate the private incentive for producing such information and
would therefore work to the disadvantage of society as a whole." Id. at 33.
201. Id. at 9 ("[I]n the cases requiring disclosure . . . the knowledgeable party's
special information is typically not the fruit of a deliberate search."). Dean
Kronman's conception of when information is deliberately acquired is somewhat
broad.
[The term "deliberately acquired information" means information whose
acquisition entails costs which would not have been incurred but for the
likelihood, however great, that the information in question would actually
be produced. These costs may include, of course, not only direct search
costs (the cost of examining the corporation's annual statement) but the
costs of developing an initial expertise as well (for example, the cost of
attending business school). If the costs incurred in acquiring the informa-
tion . .. would have been incurred in any case-that is, whether or not
the information was forthcoming-the information may be said to have
been casually acquired. The distinction between deliberately and casually
acquired information is a shorthand way of expressing this economic dif-
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Professor Saul Levmore also approaches the situation through
an analysis of the cost of disclosure to knowledgeable parties and
to society. °2 Specifically, he finds situations in which a require-
ment of disclosure will encourage free riders and discourage the
socially beneficial search for knowledge.03 Although Professor
Levmore allows that "[m]odern cases ... can be read as signaling
a trend toward increased disclosure requirements,""2 4 he sug-
gests consideration of policy alternatives intended to achieve
"fairness""2 5 while encouraging economically efficient behav-
ior.2" Professor Levmore identifies economic costs associated
with disclosure. To illustrate, he differentiates between two situa-
tions. In the first, a homeowner knows that the house being sold
is infested with termites. The law should require the seller to
ference. Although in reality it may be difficult to determine whether any
particular item of information has been acquired in one way or the other,
the distinction between these two types of information has . . . consider-
able analytical usefulness.
Id. at 13. In Dean Kronman's analysis, parties can be forced to disclose information
that is not the product of a deliberate search because the disclosure will not discour-
age the future production of socially useful information:
The unilateral mistake cases are indistinguishable, in principle, from the
other contract cases . . . which impose a duty to disclose. These cases are
distinguished as a group by the fact that in each of them the social inter-
est in efficiency is best served by allocating the risk of unilateral mistake
to the part with knowledge (since this is unlikely to discourage him from
investing in the production of socially useful information).
Id. at 33.
202. Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Con-
tracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117 (1982).
203. Id. at 132-33. Professor Levmore uses as an example a situation in which a
mineral company is buying land from a farmer. If the corporation discloses its infor-
mation about the presence of valuable minerals on the site it will be forced to pay a
premium or refrain from looking for minerals. Either the shareholders of the corpo-
ration are harmed or society is harmed by a decrease in an activity seen as socially
useful. Id.
204. Id. at 134.
205. Id. at 122. In the context of insider trading in securities, the primary focus of
his analysis, Professor Levmore defines fairness as "achieved when insiders and out-
siders are in equal positions. That is, a system is fair if we would not expect one
group to envy the position of the other." Id. In the context of partnership-related
transactions, parallel fairness would presumably be achieved if the disclosure rules did
not give any identifiable class of parties-buyers or sellers; contributors of capital,
labor, or goods; transferees or transferors of partnership interest-a consistent ad-
vantage.
206. Id. at 132-33.
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disclose the termite problem because allowing non-disclosure is
wasteful to society in that potential buyers will incur duplicate
inspection costs and unwary buyers will allow termite damage to
continue." 7 The second situation involves a mineral company
buying farmland that its research and exploration efforts have
identified as having mineral potential. Here, Professor Levmore
observes, the efficiency analysis leads to a different result. The
farmer-seller is unlikely to explore for minerals, a socially benefi-
cial activity. The corporation will not explore if it must disclose.
Thus, a rule allowing non-disclosure by the knowledgeable buyer
is justified.0 8
One of the alternatives Professor Levmore identifies, which he
christens "optimal dishonesty," would further complicate the
analysis.2" Under the Levmore optimal dishonesty rule, parties
to commercial transactions would be allowed to withhold relevant
information, and even make affirmative misstatements of materi-
al facts ("dishonest disclosure" in the Levmore scheme) "in cases
in which the misinformation would only cause the misinformed
party to behave as he would have without the information, and in
which it would be unfair-because of the cost and risk of extor-
tion-to require disclosure of the informed party."
210
In contrast, Professor Deborah DeMott argues convincingly
that the commercial transaction disclosure cases cannot be ratio-
nalized by a single unifying theme or general doctrine, and that it
is error to attempt to do so. 211 Professor DeMott isolates non-
economic factors that have some explanatory power, such as the
different obligations of sellers and buyers,2 12 and differences in
reactions to different types of loss. 213 Rather than use any
207. Id. at 135.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 140. Professor Levmore's tentative conclusion is that more consideration
should be given to "always-disclose" or "disclose-or-suspend" options in tandem with
a right of "private eminent domain" in the knowledgeable party. Id. at 159.
210. Id. at 140.
211. DeMott, supra note 196, at 66-67.
212. Id. at 76, 89-91 (noting differing obligations of buyers and sellers).
213. Id. at 90. Professor DeMott suggests the existence of "a generally-shared
aversion to a particular type of loss: the discovery, after the deal is closed, that we
have bought a house infested with termites or. a car lacking an engine. This type of
loss, in turn, may be perceived as less palatable than a lost opportunity for gain or
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"sharp-edged doctrine and theory," she favors "[1]ooser-fitting
doctrine, which facilitates judicial sensitivity to context, to the
flavor of the transaction and the parties' relationship. ... ""4
How does this continuing debate relate to our partnership
hypothetical in which the knowledgeable Smith is about to dump
a bad pickup truck on the partnership? Is the situation closer to
termites in the basement or gold in the north forty? The distinc-
tion, it turns out, may be quite narrow. Dean Kronman and Pro-
fessor Levmore would presumably wish to know how Smith ac-
quired the knowledge of the truck's condition. Did Smith pay for
expensive diagnostic tests? If what is at issue is wealth redistri-
bution, Professor Levmore would not require disclosure and
would leave the parties to their (asymmetrically informed) bar-
gain; if non-disclosure will impose a social cost, then disclosure
may be justified.215 Is the cracked head wealth redistribution or
a social cost? We need to look at both "the need to encourage the
production of information" and "the societal loss that would
result from withholding information," although the societal loss
may be of diminished importance because the additional infor-
mation may be generated without significant additional cost.216
Significant factors may be whether the problem will worsen or
the uninformed party will wastefully expend money in the ab-
sence of disclosure. 17 Is the cracked head getting worse? If so,
perhaps it is a social cost favoring disclosure. Is the cracked head,
and the consequent use of oil, causing collateral damage to the
vehicle? Better still. Does Smith know of the cracked head on the
basis of an expensive diagnostic test? Then perhaps disclosure is
not appropriate, because we want the Smiths of the world to find
out why their trucks are misfiring. But if the test is inexpensive,
profit." Id.
214. Id. at 102.
215. Levmore, supra note 202, at 136-37 n.62.
216. Id. at 136 & n.61. "The societal loss that results from the extra inspection
that might be required is less important because latent defects are often discoverable
after living in a home for a time, with no extra inspection." Id. at 136 n.61. This is
also true with respect to motor vehicles. David C. Bayne, Replacement vs. Repazr: A
Consumer's Brief Challenges General Motors, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 639, 644-45 (1973)
(discussing inadequate automobile rear axle lubrication discoverable without inspec-
tion-through catastrophic failure of drivetrain).
217. Levmore, supra note 202, at 136 n.62, 137.
1608
RUPA DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS
then the social cost is diminished, and disclosure is not as critical.
Furthermore, under the proper circumstances, Professor
Levmore's optimal dishonesty rule would not require Smith to
disclose the cracked head, as she would be required to do under
the current partnership-law-based regime; it not only would allow
Smith to not disclose the problem, it would allow Smith to affir-
matively misstate the truth.
Professor DeMott, in contrast, would have the court eschew
tight doctrine and theory and allow the judge to be sensitive to
the context, character, and flavor of the transaction.21 It is far
beyond the scope of this discussion to suggest who is right in the
debate, much less who, if anyone, shall prevail. For our purposes,
it is quite sufficient to note the existence of this unresolved ques-
tion and to suggest that the Revised Act, by removing partner-
ship-related cases from the certain operation of the existing law
and casting them into the uncertainty of the general legal debate,
imposes a substantial cost upon society.219
3. The "Other Applicable Law" Does Not Provide Adequate
Guidance
The other facet of the questions how, and how well, the "other
applicable law" of "arms length" transactions will be applied in
the context of situations heretofore handled under partnership-
specific law is Whether courts can apply the other applicable law
without significant modification. The Revised Act fails on this
count as well because the body of law to which recourse is made
is not capable of being applied intact.
The intent of the drafters is clear-as to those transactions
218. DeMott, supra note 196, at 102.
219. The existing regime, under which partnership-related cases are handled under
partnership law, is not incompatible with either side of this debate. Dean Kronman
notes that where there is a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the parties
to a commercial contract "courts are more likely to require disclosure than they
would otherwise be." Kronman, supra note 199, at 18 n.49. He observes that this
requirement "makes sense from an economic point of view: a fiduciary relation can
be viewed as a deliberate form of risk sharing (the beneficiary in effect purchases the
other party's information)." Id., at 19 n.49. The existing regime is also compatible
with Professor DeMott's analysis; if the Revised Act placed these cases within the
general rule, the courts could craft an exception for partnership-related cases based
on the parties relationship as partners. See DeMott, supra note 196, at 102.
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that are excluded from coverage under the partnership law, the
partners are to be treated as if the partnership did not exist. An
example of this method, and the problems it causes, is the treat-
ment accorded partners transacting business with the partner-
ship. Under the existing regime, the partner is bound to make
full disclosure.22 ° Under the Revised Act, "the rights and obliga-
tions of the partner [transacting business with the partnership]
are the same as those of a person who is not a partner, subject to
other applicable law."2 The problem with the Revised Act ap-
proach, however, is that the outside sources of law are contextu-
al, and the identity of the partner as a partner is a critical part of
that context.
For example, the basic Uniform Commercial Code good faith
requirement222 is a subjective and not an objective standard.2"
In a sale transaction otherwise covered by the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, Revised Uniform Partnership Act section 404(f could
be interpreted two very different ways. The Revised Act provision
could hold the knowledgeable partner to the subjective good faith
standard of the Uniform Commercial Code-a standard that
requires consideration of his or her status as partner. In the
alternative, the Revised Act could be read to alter fundamentally
the Uniform Commercial Code good faith requirement by aban-
doning the well-established subjective good faith standard and
substituting in its place a wholly idiosyncratic "reasonable (non-
partner) person standard." The first reading is more plausible
because the statutory language gives no indication of such a
radical change in existing law. The official commentary is
220. Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 729-30.
221. U.P.A. § 404(f) (1994).
222. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."). The general U.C.C.
definition of good faith, "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned," id.
§ 1-201(19), would apply in situations covered by the Uniform Commercial Code, id.
§ 1-203. The Article 2 definition of good faith for a merchant, "honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade," id. §
2-103(1)(b), would apply only if the partner as to whom a disclosure obligation is
asserted is a merchant, id. § 2-104(1).
223. See Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Iowa
1975) (citing cases establishing subjective standard). "Decisions construing § 1201(19)
of the Code overwhelmingly agree that the test of good faith under that section is a
wholly subjective one of honesty." Id.
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ambiguous.224
The general contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing is
similarly contextual.225 In the Restatement (Second) model,
"[glood faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasiz-
es faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency
with the justified expectations of the other party."226 Revised
Act section 404(f) either must allow the courts to consider the
parties' partnership status or require the courts to abandon actu-
al context and substitute some artificial, non-partnership-related
expectations for the other partner's actual, historical expecta-
tions. The same dilemma, whether to allow consideration of the
partnership context notwithstanding the language of the Revised
Act or to force the courts to create a non-partnership-regarding
artificial context, arises in the application of the general rules of
unconscionability 2 7 and mistake.228
224. U.P.A. § 404 cmt. 6 (1994).
Subsection (f) authorizes partners to lend money to and transact
other business with the partnership and, in so doing, to enjoy the same
rights and obligations as a non-partner. . . . The rights and obligations of
a partner doing business with the partnership as an outsider are expressly
made subject to the usual laws governing those transactions .... The
reference to "other applicable law" makes clear that subsection (f) is not
intended to displace those laws, and thus they are preserved under Sec-
tion 104(a).
Id.
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979) (citing U.C.C. § 1-
201(19) definition of good faith).
226. Id.
227. See id. § 208 cmt. a ("The determination that a contract or term is or is not
unconscionable is made in the light of its setting, purpose and effect.").
228. The Restatement permits relief on the basis of unilateral mistake when "the
effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconsciona-
ble." Id. § 153(a). Although not technically falling within the operation of § 208
(because the unconscionability is not present when the contract is made) the official
commentary to § 153 cross-references the § 208 standards. Id. § 153 cmt. c . Even
absent a finding of unconscionability, relief for unilateral mistake may be available
where "the other party had reason to know of the mistake," id. § 153(b), but in fact
does not know of the mistake, id. § 153 cmt. e, and in the case where the other
party knows of the mistake but does not disclose it, id. § 161. The inquiry under §
161 can depend on the partnership context in two distinct ways. Disclosure can be
required when the knowledgeable party
knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other
party as to a basic assumption on which that party is making the con-
tract and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good
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The new regime inappropriately abandons the existing clear,
easily applied rules and casts partners into an unsettled area of
the law. Moreover, the rules to which the Revised Act could force
recourse simply cannot be applied in a "partnership-blind" man-
ner without either making significant modifications to the rules
or forcing the courts to decide cases based on "facts" conjured
out of the air. The solution to this problem is conceptually sim-
ple; we should reverse the Revised Act's policy of abandoning
classes of partnership-related claims historically considered with-
in partnership law. The implementation is equally
straightforward." 9
III. DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE REVISED ACT:
INTERPRETIVE CHALLENGES
What of jurisdictions that adopt the Revised Partnership Act
without the amendments required to correct contractarian error?
What of states that enact some, but not all, of the appropriate
amendments? Two types of interpretive challenges to the Revised
Act could be used to challenge the proposed disclosure regime
and return it closer to a fiduciary foundation. The first challenge
is that the Revised Act does not displace completely the common-
law disclosure regime and that significant common-law disclosure
faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.
Id. § 161(b). The obligation to disclose under this subsection depends on the situa-
tion. Id. § 161 cmt. d. Disclosure also can be required "where the other person is
entitled to know the fact because of a relation of trust and confidence between
them." Id. § 161(d).
229. Vestal, supra note 2, at 575 n.235. As to jurisdiction over the pre-formation
period, the statutory duty of loyalty in § 404(b) should be changed to include the
pre-formation period in the duty to account (§ 404(b)(1)) and the adverse interest
prohibition (§ 404(b)(2)). As to jurisdiction over partners conducting business with the
partnership, the statutory self-interest allowance (§ 404(e)) and the special rule for
transactions with the partnership (§ 404(f)) should be deleted, and a specific disclo-
sure obligation should be inserted requiring disclosure of "information regarding com-
mercial transactions between the disclosing partner and the partnership, other than
transactions that are both incidental to the business of the partnership and are on
terms and conditions generally available in a recognized market." Id. at 576 n.235.
As to partners selling partnership interests among themselves, a specific disclosure
obligation should be inserted requiring disclosure of "information regarding the value
of any partnership interest transferred between the disclosing partner and either
another partner or the partnership." Id.
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elements remain in place. The second challenge is that, properly
construed, the Revised Act provisions duplicate certain of the
common-law disclosure provisions beyond those detailed in the
statute.
A. The Revised Act Does Not Completely Displace the Common
Law as to the Disclosure Obligations of Partners Inter Se
Like the Uniform Partnership Act, the Revised Act does not
call for the wholesale displacement of the common law of part-
nerships. Rather, it provides that "[u]nless displaced by partic-
ular provisions of this [Act], the principles of law and equity
supplement this [Act]."2 ' The Revised Act drafters clearly un-
derstood how to attempt displacement; for example, the draft-
ers clearly intended for the Revised Act to displace the general
common law of fiduciary obligation within the partnership
sphere, at least as they construed fiduciary obligation.23' The
drafters did not, however, evidence such an intent to displace
the common law with respect to the disclosure obligations of
partners.232 No language in the statutory provisions that set
forth the statutory disclosure obligations even hints that the
drafters intended to work a displacement of the common-law
230. U.P.A. § 104(a) (1994).
231. Vestal, supra note 2, at 532. The Revised Act provides that "the only fiducia-
ry duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of
loyalty and the duty of care set forth in subsections [404](b) and (c)." U.P.A. §
404(a) (1994). Dean Donald J. Weidner, the Reporter for the Revised Act, notes that
§ 404 "purports to be an exclusive statement of fiduciary duties," Weidner, supra
note 24, at 857, and that the fiduciary duty section "is couched in terms of an inte-
grated and exclusive statement of the fiduciary duties of partners," Weidner, supra
note 12, at 457.
232. The duty to account for the unapproved use of partnership property is included
within the fiduciary duty of loyalty and presumably would be within the scope of
displacement, See U.P.A. § 404(b)(1) (1994). A much closer call is involved in the
common-law obligation to disclose information in transactions with the partnership.
Arguably, such transactions come within the scope of the Revised Act: "A partner
may. . . transact ... business with the partnership, and as to each . . . transaction,
the rights and obligations of the partner are the same as those of a person who is
not a partner, subject to other applicable law." Id. § 404(f). The argument is under-
cut by the contrast with the displacement language of § 404(a) and § 404(b) and by
the "subject to other applicable law" qualifier. The argument is even weaker as to
pre-formation conduct because such conduct is specifically excluded from coverage
under the fiduciary duty of loyalty as formulated in the Revised Act.
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disclosure obligations.233
Arguably, however, the disclosure obligations of partners
should be included in the general displacement of fiduciary obli-
gations. The argument is unpersuasive. It is true that, histori-
cally, the common-law disclosure obligations of partners inter se
have been couched in the language of fiduciary duty.23 4 But the
Revised Act abandons the customary definition of the term "fidu-
ciary" '235 and specifically defines the scope of the duties labeled
"fiduciary."2 6 The primary historical disclosure obligations of
the partners inter se are not on the list.237 The statutory disclo-
sure obligations of partners inter se under the Revised Act are
treated as non-fiduciary obligations.2 8 Given that treatment,
233. Compare id. § 404(a) ("The only fiduciary duties a partner owes . . . .") and
id. § 404(b) ("A partner's duty of loyalty ...is limited to the following. . . .") with
id. § 403(b) ("A partnership shall provide .. . access to its books and records.") and
id. § 403(c) ("Each partner and the partnership shall furnish . . . .") and id. §
405(b) ("A partner may maintain an action . . . with . . . an accounting ..
234. See Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 727-28.
235. Vestal, supra note 2, part II.A. This use of the term "fiduciary" to describe
obligations not within the customary definition of the concept is not limited to the
partnership context. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Cult of Efficiency, 71 TBY L.
REV. 217, 221-22, 235-38 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE .LAW (1991)) (criticizing authors
for labelling as "fiduciary" corporate obligations not within the customary definition
of the term).
236. U.P.A. § 404(a) (1994) ("The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the part-
nership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth
in subsections (b) and (c).").
237. The duty of loyalty in the Revised Act is limited to three components, only one
of which touches on a historically recognized disclosure obligation of partners inter se.
Id. § 404(b). Revised Act § 404(b)(1) defines the accounting'obligation formerly found
at § 21 of the Uniform Partnership Act, which has a disclosure component The
remaining two components of the statutory duty of loyalty under the Revised Act are
unrelated to the disclosure obligations of partners inter se. Section 404(b)(2) requires
partners "to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding up
of the partnership business as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to
the partnership." Id. § 404(b)(2). Section 404(b)(3) requires partners "to refrain from
competing with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership business before
dissolution of the partnership." Id. § 404(b)(3).
The duty of care-the other half of the fiduciary duty combination under the
Revised Act--also does not incorporate the historically recognized disclosure obliga-
tions of partners inter se. Id. § 404(c) ("A partner's duty of care to the partnership
and the other partners in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business is
limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, inten-
tional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.").
238. Id. § 403(b) (access to partnership books and records); id. § 403(c)(1) (non-
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and the general hostility to displacement under the Revised Act,
the statute has not met the "displaced by particular provisions"
test.239
The commentary supports the non-displacement interpretation:
"Subsection [403](c) is a significant revision of UPA Section 20
and provides a more comprehensive, although not exclusive, state-
ment of partners' rights and duties with respect to partnership
information other than books and records. ' 24" The history of
the Uniform Partnership Act also supports non-displacement.
Under the existing regime, the statutory and common-law disclo-
sure obligations coexist.241 One should not presume that the
drafters of the Revised Act have reversed this historical pattern
without some clear indication in the statute of that intention.
B. The Revised Act Duplicates Certain Common-Law Disclosure
Obligations Beyond Those Detailed in the Statute
What if the courts reject the non-displacement argument and
determine that the Revised Act does displace the common-law
disclosure obligations of partners inter se? Could the same dis-
closure obligations be fashioned out of the four corners of the
statute? Perhaps in some cases, although the end result is sub-
stantially less desirable than would be achieved by a finding of
non-displacement. One substantial barrier to duplication of the
common-law obligations is the structure of the Revised Act on
point. Competing concepts represented in the statute lead to
different results, with no mechanism for reconciliation in the
statute itself. Another substantial barrier to duplication is the
temporal inadequacy of the statutory provisions.
1. Partner Transactions with the Partnership
The first common-law disclosure obligation of partners con-
cerns transactions between a partner and the partnership.4 In
demand-driven disclosure obligation); id. § 403(c)(2) (demand-driven disclosure obliga-
tion); id. § 405(b) (right to judicial accounting).
239. Id. § 104(a).
240. Id. § 403 cmt. 3.
241. Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38., at 732.
242. I believe the Reuschlein and Gregory categorization "should be expanded to
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such situations, the common law requires partners to disclose
facts material to the transaction but unavailable to the partner-
ship. The obligation arises in the pre-partnership phase and ex-
tends through dissolution.2
4 3
There are four paths by which the common-law disclosure
obligation for transactions with the partnership might be found
in the statute: the fiduciary duty to account for profits and bene-
fits diverted from the partnership,244 the fiduciary duty to re-
frain from acting in a manner adverse to the partnership,245 the
non-demand-driven disclosure requirement,246 and the non-fidu-
ciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing.247
Consider, for example, when a partner buys a parcel of land
from the partnership for its fair market value as pasture, and the
include all transactions between the partnership and a partner that take place during
the formation, term, or dissolution and winding upof the partnership." Id. at 730.
243. Id. at 729-30.
244. U.P.A. § 404(b)(1) (1994).
(b) A partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other part-
ners is limited to the following:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any
property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and
winding up of the partnership business or derived from a use by the
partner of partnership property, including the appropriation of a partner-
ship opportunity ....
Id.
245. Id. § 404(b)(2).
(b) A partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other part-
ners is limited to the following:
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or
winding up of the partnership business as or on behalf of a party having
an interest adverse to the partnership . ...
Id.
246. Id. § 403(c)(1).
(c) Each partner and the partnership shall furnish to a partner, and
the legal representative of a deceased partner or partner under legal dis-
ability:
(1) without demand, any information concerning the partnership's
business and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of the
partner's rights and duties under the partnership agreement or this
[Act] ....
Id.
247. Id. § 404(d) ("A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the
other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement and exercise any
rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.").
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purchasing partner alone knows that the land contains gold
worth far in excess of the price paid the partnership. This trans-
action is a classic breach of the common-law obligation to make
disclosure. Does the statutory scheme duplicate the common-law
result? On cursory review, the Revised Act looks promising. The
partner would seem to have an obligation to disclose the presence
of the gold, and, failing disclosure, would have an obligation with-
in the fiduciary duty of loyalty to the partnership to account for
the profit or benefit derived from the misappropriation of the
partnership opportunity.248 The partner also would seem to vio-
late the statutory fiduciary duty of loyalty to the partnership by
breaking the directive that partners not deal with the partner-
ship as an adverse party.249 The partner appears to have an obli-
gation to disclose under the statutory non-demand-driven disclo-
sure obligation.25 ° Consequently, the non-disclosing partner prob-
ably also would run afoul of the statutory, but non-fiduciary,
obligation of good faith and fair dealing.25' On closer review, how-
ever, the results are not so clear-cut.
Reliance on the fiduciary-duty-of-loyalty-based paths is precar-
ious for two reasons. First, the same section that defines the fidu-
ciary duties of partners contains the language: "A partner does
not violate a duty or obligation under this [Act] or under the
partnership agreement merely because the partner's conduct
furthers'the partner's own interest." '252 The history of this de-
based formulation is interesting.253 The drafters started from
the proposition that "[a] partner must act solely on behalf of the
partnership in all matters connected with that partner's position
as partner"254a reasonable restatement of the common law on
point but one that "was rejected as unnecessarily restrictive for
partnership purposes."255 At the end of the drafting process, the
statute declares that not only is the pursuit of self-interest not a
248. Id. § 404(b)(1).
249. Id. § 404(b)(2).
250. Id. § 403(c)(1).
251. Id. § 404(d).
252. Id. § 404(e).
253. Vestal, supra note 2, at 553-55.
254. U.P.A. § 20Y(a) (Jan. 9, 1989, Draft).
255. U.P.A. § 404 cmt. (July 30 - Aug. 6, 1992, Meeting Draft).
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violation of the Revised Act, but it cannot be made a violation of
the partnership agreement-a rather curious position for a
contractarian to adopt.256 The commentary to the self-interest
insulation language is significantly less sweeping than is the
statutory language,25 but the section presents an obstacle to
the use of either fiduciary duty of loyalty prong to recreate the
common-law disclosure obligation relating to transactions with
the partnership.
The fiduciary-duty-of-loyalty-based paths are precarious for a
second reason. The same section that defines the fiduciary duties
of partners contains language addressing the situation in which
partners do business with the partnership: "A partner may lend
money to and transact other business with the partnership, and
as to each loan or transaction, the rights and obligations of the
partner are the same as those of a person who is not a partner,
subject to other applicable law. ' 25  Although the commentary
suggests a narrower purpose,259 the language of the provision is
not narrow and presents a substantial barrier to using either
fiduciary duty of loyalty prong for the recreation of the common-
law disclosure obligation relating to transactions with the part-
nership.
The result is outrageous if the partner in our illustration has
no fiduciary obligation to tell the partnership about the gold on
its property, but that result is possible under the existing, am-
256. Vestal, supra note 2, at 554.
257. U.P.A. § 404 cmt. 5 (1994). The commentary to § 404(e) reads in its entirety:
5. Subsection (e) is new and deals expressly with a very basic issue
on which the UPA is silent. A partner as such is not a trustee and is not
held to the same standards as a trustee. Subsection (e) makes clear that
a partner's conduct is not deemed to be improper merely because it
serves the partner's own individual interest.
That admonition has particular application to the duty of loyalty and
the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. It underscores the partner's
rights as an owner and principal in the enterprise, which must always be
balanced against his duties and obligations as an agent and fiduciary. For
example, a partner who, with consent, owns a shopping center may, under
subsection (e), legitimately vote against a proposal by the partnership to
open a competing shopping center.
Id.
258. Id. § 404(f).
259. Id. § 404 cmt. 6 (casting rationale in terms of partner purchase of partnership
assets at foreclosure and tax sales).
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biguous language. That such a result is a possibility merely em-
phasizes the inadequacy of the Revised Act's fiduciary duty provi-
sions."
If not the fiduciary duty of loyalty, what of the statutory, non-
demand-driven disclosure requirement?... The argument in sup-
port of statutorily mandated disclosure is that knowledge of the
gold on the partnership property was "information concerning
the partnership's business and affairs reasonably required for the
proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the part-
nership agreement or this [Act]."26 So it is, as to the non-pur-
chasing partner who has a right to participate in the partnership
business" and an obligation to use partnership property only
for partnership purposes.Y Because the non-demand-driven dis-
closure obligation is an obligation of both the partnership and
"each partner,"2" the purchasing partner has an obligation to
disclose the presence of the gold on the property. The Revised Act
eliminates possible doubt as to interpretation of the disclosure
requirement through its obligation of good faith and fair dealing,
which is, by its terms, applicable. 6
Does the non-demand-driven statutory disclosure obligation
perfectly recreate the first common-law disclosure obligation?
260. Professor Dickerson treats the language of § 404(e) as shifting the burden of
proof from the partner to the partnership in cases where the partner has advanced
personal interest over the collective interest. Dickerson, supra note 2, at 144. Profes-
sor Ribstein agrees that the language is confusing and leads to erroneous implica-
tions. Ribstein, Prime Time, supra note 3, at 54-55.
261. See U.P.A. § 403(c)(1) (1994).
262. Id.
263. Id. § 401(f) ("Each partner has equal rights in the management and conduct of
the partnership business."). The partners may fully modify this right by agreement.
See id § 103(a).
264. See id § 401(g) ("A partner may use or possess partnership property only on
behalf of the partnership."). The partners may fully modify this right by agreement.
See id. § 103(a).
265. Id. § 403(c) ("Each partner and the partnership shall furnish to a part-
ner . . ").
266. Id. § 404(d) ("A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the
other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement and exercise any
rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing."). Note that the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing is one of the statutory sections as to which
the Revised Act restricts the right of the partners to modify the statutory language.
See id. § 103(b)(5).
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Regrettably, it does not completely do so because of the temporal
limitation of the statutory obligation. The common-law obligation
with respect to partnership transactions extended from the pre-
formation period through dissolution." 7 The non-demand-driv-
en statutory obligation is not affirmatively limited in temporal
application, as is the fiduciary duty of loyalty for example,268
but the language of the statute supports an interpretation exclud-
ing the statutory requirement from the pre-formation stage. 9
This discrepancy is significant and makes the statutorily-based
obligation an imperfect replica of the common law.
The last path is the non-fiduciary obligation of good faith and
fair dealing.20 A partner must discharge duties to the partner-
ship consistent with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing,
and each partner has an obligation to use partnership property
only on behalf of the partnership. 271 The Revised Act, however,
does not resolve the conflict with the statutory provision which
states that "the rights and obligations of the partner [who trans-
acts business with the partnership] are the same as those of a
person who is not a partner, subject to other applicable law. ' 272
If the specific trumps the general, the knowledgeable partner is
required only to meet the non-Revised-Act standards applicable
to a non-partner party to the transaction, such as the Uniform
Commercial Code standard of good faith,27 the general contrac-
tual duty of good faith and fair dealing,274 and the general con-
tractual remedies for mistake or unconscionability.2 As noted,
267. See Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 729-30.
268. See U.P.A. § 404(b)(1) (1994) (accounting obligation "in the conduct and wind-
ing up of the partnership business"); id. § 404(b)(2) (adverse actions obligation "in
the conduct or winding up of the partnership business").
269. Id. § 403(c). The section speaks in terms of "partners" and the "partnership"
and focuses on "information concerning the partnership's business and affairs." Id.
270. Id. § 404(d) ("A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the
other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement and exercise any
rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.").
271. Id. § 401(g).
272. Id. § 404(f).
273. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978); see supra note 222.
274. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
275. See id. § 208. The official commentary to the Restatement treatment of uncon-
scionability notes that "gross disparity in the values exchanged may be an important
factor in a determination that a contract is unconscionable." Id. § 208 cmt. c. A
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reliance on these legal doctrines is unsatisfactory.
2. Partner Transactions Inter Se
The second common-law disclosure obligation of partners con-
cerns the purchase by one partner of another's interest.27 In
such situations, partners are required to disclose information
unavailable to the other party to the transaction and which bears
on the value of the partnership interest being sold.277
In this case, the fiduciary duty to refrain from acting in a man-
ner adverse to the partnership27 cannot be used to replicate the
common-law disclosure requirement. Although a partner owes
the fiduciary duty of loyalty, of which the prohibition on ad-
versarial conduct is a part,279 to both the partnership and the
other partners,"' the duty to refrain from adversarial actions is
defined in terms of harm to the partnership, not harm to the
other partners individually.28'
The fiduciary duty to account for profits and benefits divert-
ed from the partnership82 offers an interesting, but ultimate-
ly flawed, possibility for replicating the common-law disclosure
obligation of partners transferring partnership interests inter
se. The possibility arises from the wording of the accounting
gross disparity in values exchanged "may also corroborate indications of defects in
the bargaining process." Id. A "gross inequality of bargaining power, together with
terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may confirm indications that the
transaction involved elements of deception. . . ." Id. § 208 cmt. d. Factors support-
ing a finding of unconscionability include "knowledge of the stronger party that the
weaker party will be unable to receive substantial benefits from the contract; [and]
knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker party is unable reasonably to pro-
tect his [or her] interests by reason of. . . ignorance." Id.
276. See Vestal, Disclosure, supra note 38, at 727-35.
277. Professors Reuschlein and Gregory summarize the obligation as: "Both selling
and purchasing partner are duty bound to reveal such facts as touch the value of the
property which are not available to the other partner." REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY,
supra note 42, § 189, at 280 (citing Johnson v. Buck, 540 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976)).
278. U.P.A. § 404(b)(2) (1994).
279. Id.
280. Id. §§ 404(a), (b).
281. Id. § 404(b)(2). The duty is "to refrain from dealing with the partnership in
the conduct or winding up of the partnership business as or on behalf of a party
having an interest adverse to the partnership." Id. (emphasis added).
282. Id. § 404(b)(1).
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section:
(b) A partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the
other partners is limited to the following:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for
it any property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the
conduct and winding up of the partnership business or derived
from a use by the partner of partnership property, including
the appropriation of a partnership opportunity ......
The duty to account for "benefit derived by the partner ... from
a use by the partner of partnership property," '284 precisely de-
scribes the situation if the undisclosed information is partnership
property. Because the clause does not require harm to the part-
nership, but merely benefit to the partner,285 it could apply in
situations where it is another partner, and not the partnership,
who suffers injury. This reading is in harmony with the Revised
Act's provision that partnership property is only to be used for
partnership purposes.286
If the non-disclosure of partnership information material to the
sale price of a partnership interest transferred inter se violates
the fiduciary duty to account, then it is a straightforward matter
to find a duty to disclose under both the non-demand-driven dis-
closure requirement 287 and the disclosure component of the
non-fiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 28 The
potential flaw in the argument comes from the operation of the
accounting obligation. By the terms of the statute, the obligation
is "to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it
any ... benefit.., derived from a use by the partner of partner-
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. § 401(g) ("A partner may use or possess partnership property only on be-
half of the partnership.").
287. Id. § 403(c)(1). The partner in possession of the information would be obligated
to furnish to all the other partners, including the other party to the transfer, "with-
out demand, any information concerning the partnership's business and affairs rea-
sonably required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the
partnership agreement or this [Act]." Id. In this case the information would be nec-
essary for the other partners to advance their right to an accounting.
288. Id. § 404(d); id. § 404 cmt. 4.
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ship property."289 But in this case, where one partner has with-
held information from another partner material to a transfer of a
partnership interest inter se, the recovery should go to the other
partner, not to the partnership. Unless one can make an argu-
ment that the partnership receives the recovery in trust for the
partner, which is difficult to do given the statutory treatment of
partnership property,29 the misdirection of the remedy may
cast doubt on the underlying theory.2 '
If the fiduciary duty to account for profits and benefits divert-
ed from the use of partnership property does not apply,292 it
may still be possible to recreate the common-law disclosure obli-
gation using either the non-demand-driven disclosure re-
quirement29 or the disclosure component of the non-fiduciary
289. Id. § 404(b)(1).
290. Id. §§ 203, 204. Section 203 provides that "[piroperty acquired by a partner-
ship is property of the partnership and not of the partners individually." Id. § 203.
The commentary notes the "acquired by" language is given content in § 204. Id. §
203 cmt. Section 204 provides flatly that "[p]roperty is partnership property if ac-
quired in the name of: (1) the partnership . . . " id. § 204(a), and that "[plroperty
is acquired in the name of the partnership by a transfer to: (1) the partnership in
its name .. . " id. § 204(b). Notwithstanding the statutory language, the commen-
tary indicates some room for an argument that a recovery, even in the name of the
partnership, might be deemed the property of the partner who was a party to the
transfer with the non-disclosing partner. See id. § 204 cmt. 3 ("Ultimately, it is the
intention of the partners that controls whether property belongs to the partnership or
to one or more of the partners in their individual capacities, at least as among the
partners themselves.").
291. At least one commentary supports the analysis. See, e.g., BROMBERG &
RIBSTEIN, supra note 42, at 6:61-62. Professors Bromberg and Ribstein believe that
the obligation to account supports the obligation to disclose transfers of partnership
interests between partners:
The duty [to render complete information] arises during the partnership's
operations and in connection with interpartner transfers of partnership
interests. . . . U.P.A. § 21 confirms this broad approach by providing for
a fiduciary duty to account for benefits derived from "any transaction
connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership."
Id. (quoting U.P.A. § 21(1) (1969)). Presumably, if the statutory accounting obligation
confirms the obligation to disclose in the present regime, an identical statutory ac-
counting obligation would support an identical common-law disclosure obligation in
the proposed regime.
292. See U.P.A. § 404(b)(1) (1994).
293. Id. § 403(c)(1). The partner in possession of the information would be obligated
to furnish to all the other partners, including the other party to the transfer, "with-
out demand, any information concerning the partnership's business and affairs rea-
sonably required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the
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obligation of good faith and fair dealing.29
The non-demand-driven disclosure requirement would apply if
the material information constituted "information concerning the
partnership's business and affairs reasonably required for the
proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the part-
nership agreement or this [Act]."295 A court might give the lan-
guage such a construction if it liberally reads the modifier
"proper. '  Again, possible doubt as to interpretation of the
disclosure requirement should be resolved in favor of disclosure
by reference to the obligation of good faith and fair dealing which
is, by its terms, applicable.297
The non-fiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing,
standing alone, presents a somewhat more favorable prospect.29
The argument would be that the transfer of the selling partner's
interest to an existing partner is an "exercise of rights" under
both the Revised Act and the partnership agreement; therefore,
the selling partner is bound to meet the good faith and fair deal-
ing standard, and the standard requires disclosure.
That such a transfer is an "exercise of rights" under the Re-
vised Act is an argument well-taken. If a partnership is operating
under the statutory defaults, "[e]ach partner has equal rights in
the management and conduct of the partnership business." '299
Because a partner who purchases another partner's interest
would receive no added voice in the management of the partner-
ship, the purchasing partner might be content to receive only an
assignment of the selling partner's right to receive distribu-
tions."'0 Under the Revised Act, as under the Uniform Partner-
partnership agreement or this [Act]." Id. In this case the information would be nec-
essary for the other partners to advance their right to an accounting.
294. Id. § 404(d) & cmt. 4.
295. Id. § 403(c)(1).
296. A liberal reading is not a strained one. The definitions of "proper" include
"sanctioned as according with equity, justice, ethics, or rationale," and "socially ap-
propriate: according with established traditions and feelings of rightness and appro-
priateness." WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1817 (1986).
297. U.P.A. § 404(d) (1994) ("A partner shall discharge the duties to the partner-
ship and the other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement and
exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.").
298. See id.
299. Id. § 401(f). This language tracks that of the parallel Uniform Partnership Act
provision. See U.P.A. § 18(e) (1969).
300. Indeed, if the purchasing partner trusted the selling partner (or the selling
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ship Act, a partner has no right to transfer the entire partnership
interest and, by the transfer, constitute the transferee a part-
ner,"0 ' but a partner can assign the right to receive distribu-
tions without the consent of the other partners.0 2 Surely this
exercise of rights under the Revised Act suffices to bring the
transfer within the scope of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
On the other hand, the partners could vary the statutory de-
faults and provide for non-per-capita participation in manage-
ment, so that a transferee will wish to have a full partnership
interest, and not merely the right to distributions. The partners
then could provide a mechanism in the partnership agreement for
the transfer of a partnership interest (if only to existing partners)
without the consent of the other partners. Actions taken as a
matter of right pursuant to such an amendment of the statutory
defaults also would trigger the good faith and fair dealing re-
partner could be properly induced) to share the purchasing partner's interpretation of
the partners' fiduciary duties and business judgment, the purchasing partner might
prefer to have the selling partner remain a partner for voting purposes.
301. U.P.A. § 401(i) (1994) ("A person may become a partner only with the consent
of all of the partners."); U.P.A. § 18(g) (1969) ("No person can become a member of
a partnership without the consent of all the partners.").
302. U.P.A. §§ 502, 503 (1994); U.P.A. §§ 26, 27 (1969). The Uniform Partnership
Act speaks in terms of a partner's "share of the profits and surplus," id. § 26,
whereas the Revised Act speaks in terms of a "partner's right to receive distribu-
tions," U.P.A. § 502 (1994), but no substantive change is apparently intended, see id.
§ 502 cmt.
303. Such a distinction also might help to differentiate the situation covered by the
common-law disclosure obligation, a transfer inter se, from the pattern not covered by
the common law, a transfer from a partner to a non-partner. However, nothing in
the analysis prevents the conclusion that the drafters have inadvertently expanded
upon the common-law disclosure obligation by making it applicable to transfers of
partnership interests to non-partners. The "discharge duties" provision is limited on
its face to duties to the partnership or other partners, whereas the "exercise rights"
language is not so limited. Compare the first clause of § 404(d), "[a] partner shall
discharge the duties to the partnership and the other partners under this [Act] or
under the partnership agreement. . . consistently with the obligation of good faith
and fair dealing," U.P.A. § 404(d) (1994), with the section's second clause, "[a] part-
ner shall . . . exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing," id. Several interpretations of the second clause are possible. For exam-
ple, the clause could be read as either "[a] partner shall . . . exercise any rights
(under this Act or under the partnership agreement] consistently with the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing," or "[a] partner shall . . . exercise any rights [relating
to the partnership or the other partners under this Act or under the partnership
agreement] consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing."
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quirement, as the "exercise of rights" under the partnership
agreement."°4
The hardest case would be where the statutory default on
participation in management was changed, but the statutory
default on the consent of the other partners was not. Even in this
case, the stronger argument is that the transfer of the full part-
nership interest was an "exercise of rights" under the partner-
ship agreement, even if qualified by the approval requirement.
If the obligation of good faith and fair dealing applies to trans-
fers of partnership interests inter se, do good faith and fair deal-
ing require disclosures equivalent to those required under the
common law? The obligation of good faith and fair dealing is not
defined in the Revised Act.05 Nor is the meaning of the lan-
guage fixed; the drafters intended the meaning to be developed
by courts over time."0 8 The drafters specifically note, however,
that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing may impose
disclosure requirements beyond those expressly provided in the
Revised Act. 0 7 It is entirely reasonable to believe that the
courts, when faced with giving content to an obligation of good
faith and fair dealing which is designed to include a disclosure
component, will look for guidance to the pre-Revised-Act common
law for guidance. In doing so, the courts may be persuaded to
adopt the existing common-law disclosure requirement for trans-
actions between the partnership and the partners.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. § 404 cmt. 4.
The meaning of "good faith and fair dealing" is not firmly fixed under
present law. "Good faith" clearly suggests a subjective element, while "fair
dealing" implies an objective component. It was decided to leave the term
undefined in the Act and allow the courts to develop its meaning based
on the experience of real cases.
Id. "Good faith and fair dealing" under the Revised Act is not the same as "good
faith" under the Uniform Commercial Code. The drafters rejected both the general
U.C.C. definition, "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned," U.C.C. §
1-201(19) (1990), and the Article 2 definition of good faith for a merchant, "honesty
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade," id. § 2-103(1)(b), as "too narrow." See U.P.A. § 404 cmt. 4 (1994).
307. U.P.A. § 404 cmt. 4 (1994) ("In some situations the obligation of good faith
includes a disclosure component. Depending on the circumstances, a partner may
have an affirmative disclosure obligation that supplements the Section 403 duty to
render information.").
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IV. CONCLUSION
The substantive errors and ambiguities in the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act disclosure provisions are serious and promise
confusion for bench, bar, and clients. These errors require enact-
ing states to modify the uniform provisions, and their presence
suggests that, in the long term, the Conference should withdraw
and rework the revision.
But the substantive errors and ambiguities of the Revised Act
compel us to withdraw and rework the Revised Act for a more
basic reason. In the disclosure provisions, we confront clearly the
stark implications of the contractarian premise, and we see how
dramatically contractarianism diverges from our long-established,
reasonable expectations in partnership matters. The drafters
were rightly uncomfortable with a regime of partnership law that
allows partners to bargain away their rights to all disclo-
sures-their access to all information. The drafters thus sought
to preserve as inviolate a core of information, a foundation of
rights and remedies."' 8 They left open challenges based on non-
displacement of the common law and contradictions internal to
the Revised Act. In the end, and to their credit, the drafters
seemingly have concluded that strict contractarianism is elegant
theory but bad law.
This disillusionment with the hard edge of contractarianism is
not confined to the disclosure obligations of partners, or even to
partnership law in general. In many areas of the law, scholarship
is emerging that convincingly questions the value of the
contractarian premise, scholarship that suggests the value of
fiduciary-based analysis in its many and rich variations. Valuable
work has identified the nature and purpose of fiduciary obliga-
tion."9 We have been reminded forcefully that the language in
308. See id. § 103(b) (listing non-waivable provisions).
309. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obli-
gation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879; DeMott, supra note 183 (exploring legal taxonomy of
fiduciary obligation). Professor DeMott links her general observations to the partner-
ship context, at one point suggesting that the partnership rules requiring disclosure
in the pre-formation stage are more appropriately 'conceptualized as mandatory rules
rather than default rules. Id. at 485-86. It is ironic, given Professor DeMott's percep-
tive comment, that a pre-formation disclosure obligation is neither a mandatory nor a
default fiduciary rule under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. See U.P.A. §
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which we couch our discussions of fiduciary duty is terribly im-
portant 1 ° and that some law-and-economics scholars have used
the term "fiduciary" to describe concepts that are not at all fidu-
ciary within the historically-accepted meaning of the term."
Other scholars view fiduciary obligation as a point of connection
between the static jurisprudence of the formal economy and the
dynamic jurisprudence of the informal economy, a trace indicator
that "records an absence of normative, material suspension of the
norms of static jurisprudence." ' 2
404(b) (1994).
310. See Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty?
Directors' Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALI's Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 954, 962-83 (1993) ("The language we use to talk
about fiduciary duty is important if the word 'fiduciary' is to retain its educational
power.").
311. Mitchell, supra note 235, at 220-22, 235-38. Professor Mitchell argues that the
duty described by Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel as "fiduciary" "is unlike
any customary legal formulation of fiduciary duty." Id. at 221. Judge Easterbrook
and Professor Fischel substitute a hypothetical bilateral bargain for customary for-
mulations of fiduciary duty: "'Socially optimal fiduciary rules approximate the bargain
that investors and managers would have reached if they could have bargained (and
enforced their agreements) at no cost."' Id. at 235 (quoting EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 235, at 92). Such a formulation, as Professor Mitchell observes, changes
essential elements of the traditional fiduciary formulation, such as the identity of the
beneficiary, the absence of arms-length bargaining, and the unidirectional flow of
benefits. See id. at 236-37. I have made a parallel point with respect to the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act, arguing that contractarian advocates misconstrue the nature
of the fiduciary obligation and label certain obligations as fiduciary although they do
not fit within the customary formulation of fiduciary duty. Vestal, supra note 2, at
537-45.
312. Arthur J. Jacobson, The Other Path of the Law, 103 YALE L.J. 2213, 2235
(1994). Professor Jacobson identifies fiduciary obligation as one of "two exemplary
doctrines ... that engrave a trace of dynamic jurisprudence in the formal jurispru-
dence." Id. at 2234. Professor Jacobson cites the Revised Uniform Partnership Act as
an example of a misformulation which loses the dynamic essence of fiduciary obliga-
tion:
[Blecause they are etched in the legal system established by static juris-
prudence, fiduciary norms take the form of generally applicable, forward-
looking norms .... On the surface, fiduciary law looks as if it can be
colonized by static jurisprudence, like common law. Yet rules of thumb
are only presumptive-starting-points for analysis. Fiduciary law reserves a
right to scrutinize every aspect of a transaction, possibly ousting rules of
thumb. It asserts a limitless, general supervisory power.
Because fiduciary norms take the form of generally applicable, for-
ward-looking norms, lawyers can easily forget or reject their inherent
supervisory power. Thus, law and economics scholars have urged the for-
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On the corporate side, fiduciary-related scholarship has devel-
oped in interesting directions. Commentators have identified the
fiduciary nature of relations within the enterprise as a key ele-
ment in the creation of the trust that makes the corporate form
possible. 13 Some have proposed fiduciary-based rules to reverse
the excessive contractarian .erosion in both the duty of care 14
and the duty of loyalty.315 Scholars have advocated a return to
fiduciary duty with respect to close corporations 16 and the rela-
mulation, in advance, of crisp, precise fiduciary rules that parties can opt
out of by contract. Their vision of fiduciary obligation utterly suppresses
its supervisory power, shifting it from trace to static jurisprudence. The
drafters of the new Revised Uniform Partnership Act have thoroughly
implemented the contract model of fiduciary obligation by confining it to
a list of precise obligations that fiduciaries can alter by contract. The old
Uniform Partnership Act assumed the existence of a supervisory power,
without even expressing it in the form of a static norm.
Id. at 2235 (citations omitted).
313. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J.
425, 434-36 (1993). Professor Mitchell evaluates the fairness test and finds it an
inadequate substitute for a fiduciary duty standard. Id. at 475 ("The fairness
test . . . not only misses the point of fiduciary duty but also is inherently flawed.").
314. See Nat Stern, Circumuenting Lax Fiduciary Standards: The Possibility of
Shareholder Multistate Class Actions for Directors' Breach of the Duty of Due Care,
72 NEB. L. REV. 1, 3-11 (1993) (proposing enactment of state "fiduciary outreach
statutes" to protect domestic shareholders of foreign corporations).
315. See Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Duty of
Loyalty: Understanding the Self-Interested Director Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. REV.
655 (1992) (supporting fiduciary duty of loyalty analysis not mechanical rules for
evaluating self-interested director transactions).
316. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1729-30 (1990). An interesting counterpoint is suggested by
Professor O'Neill. See Terry A. O'Neill, Self-Interest and Concern for Others in the
Owner-Managed Firm: A Suggested Approach to Dissolution and Fiduciary Obligation
in Close Corporations, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 646 (1992). Professor O'Neill notes
this recharacterization of fiduciary obligation, id. at 657, and argues that this
recharacterization, which focuses on participant expectations, is better suited to the
close corporation setting than the traditional formulation, id. at 689-708. Professor
O'Neill's proposed solution is to allow dissolution of owner-managed close corporations
at the will of any owner-manager. Id.
The value that the law should promote in owner-managed fin-s,
rather, is the value of caring-that is, of enabling the participants to be
attentive to their own needs and desires, and also receptive and respon-
sive to their co-venturers' needs and desires. The rule proposed in this
article, allowing dissolution of the enterprise at the will of any owner-
manager, seeks to encourage the parties to resolve their differences by
talking, listening and compromising. It seeks to allow them to pursue
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tions of corporate bondholders to the corporations in which they
have an interest."1 ' One has even suggested that allowing varia-
tions in the standards of fiduciary duty would be an appropriate
mechanism to reconcile the corporate form with the social goals
of Indian tribal participants.318 Scholars are working toward a
their own, and each other's, welfare in a healthy and caring relationship.
Id. at 708. Arguably, Professor O'Neill too quickly dismisses the traditional fiduciary
formulation. In fact, .she at one point describes in favorable terms a legal regime that
approaches the traditional fiduciary world:
A legal regime that best accounts for these attributes of the
participants' relationship would be one that, at least, encourages commu-
nication among the parties. The legal scheme would also encourage the
parties to behave responsibly toward one another-not only in the sense
of living up to their promises or commitments, but also in the sense of
being responsive to each other's needs.
Id. at 699. But Professor O'Neill rejects legal mechanisms that require such behavior
in favor of mechanisms that merely encourage it:
A regime that requires the participants to behave responsibly toward each
other, however, would be unacceptable. An action is not authentically
responsible unless it is freely chosen. A regime that gives a participant no
practical option except to serve her colleagues' needs or desires is not
promoting responsibility-it is creating servitude.
Id. at 699-700 (citations omitted). Advocates of the traditional fiduciary formulation
would counter that actions taken in fulfillment of fiduciary obligations are "authenti-
cally responsible" because the parties exercise free choice in opting into the relation-
ship. With this caveat, the traditional fiduciary regime would appear to fit Professor
O'Neill's requirements, although inadvertent and unsophisticated partners-who do
not realize they have committed to behave responsibly-complicate the analysis.
317. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1165 (1990). Professor Mitchell has identified the abandonment of fiduciary
analysis with a narrowness in the dominant wing of contemporary corporation law
scholarship:
Coupled with [a] needlessly formalistic analytical approach is an in-
creasing parochialism in corporate law scholarship in identifying the goals
of corporate law in ordering internal corporate relationships. All but ig-
nored by this approach is the powerful use of legal principles to express
higher aspirations of community and cooperation such as those underlying
fiduciary duty.
Id. at 1167 (citations omitted).
318. Michael M. Pacheco, Toward a Truer Sense of Sovereignty: Fiduciary Duty in
Indian Corporations, 39 S.D. L. REV. 49, .0 (1994). Pacheco proposes enactment of a
federal corporations law specifically for Indian corporations, under which statute "a
tribe or tribal corporation could set its own standards of fiduciary duty." Id. This is
appropriate, he argues, because "[a] federal Indian corporation act allowing the tribes
to regulate their own corporations and define their own standards of fiduciary duty
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multi-fiduciary model of the corporation that recognizes the legit-
imate demands of non-shareholder constituencies and the social
dimension of corporation law. 19
Correcting the substantive errors and resolving the ambiguities
in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act is part of this larger de-
bate.320  It is, in some way, a small thing to undo the
contractarian error in partnership law when considered against
the backdrop of the larger debate. As part of a more general
response to the contractarian revolution, however, the return of
partnership law to a fiduciary foundation is surely an appropriate
undertaking.
would be more just and more faithful to the tribes' causes than the continued use of
laws designed by non-Indians for non-Indians." Id. at 92. A fundamental divergence
between the goals underlying Indian and non-Indian corporations supports such dif-
ferential treatment:
Because of the unique group nature of Indian communities, a tribe's
involvement in corporate activities necessarily must be a social pro-
cess. . . . [T]he average Anglo corporation reflects the Anglo goal of the
accumulation of material wealth. It follows, then, that Indian corporations
should be permitted to reflect Indian goals. Since the maintenance and
protection of peoplehood and community are foremost tribal priorities,
Indian corporations "may be less about creating wealth than about creat-
ing ... choices for the continued existence and cohesion" of the tribe.
Id. at 68 (second alteration in original) (quoting John C. Mohawk, Indian Economic
Development: An Evolving Concept of Sovereignty, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 495, 499 (1991))
(other citations omitted).
319. See, e.g., David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Cor-
porate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993); David Millon, Redefining Corpo-
rate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Prac-
tical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TE. L. REV. 579
(1992); Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts:
Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty To Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189
(1991).
320. See Dickerson, supra note 2; Vestal, supra note 2, at 537-45.
